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The Norwegian laundry detergent market is highly concentrated. Throughout the history of 
industry, Lilleborg, has had an almost monopolistic position in the market with only a few 
competitors, and none of comparable size. This thesis takes us through the history of the 
Norwegian market from the birth of the Norwegian soap industry by Akerselva in Oslo, 
through a resigning prime minister, a detergent war, and environmental concerns ending up in 
the modern detergent industry. Through World War, attempted entry and environmental 
changes, the market leader remains the number one producer of laundry detergent in Norway.   
Based on the history of the industry, the developments of market structure, and entry and exit 
in the Norwegian laundry detergent industry is analyzed using a foundation based on 
economic theory. The theories introduced describe the industry life cycle as well as how 
advertising, an important part of the laundry detergent market, affects structure. In addition, 
theory describing how a firm may act strategically to maintain a dominant market position is 
introduced. 
Analysis of the Norwegian detergent market is fundamentally based on the industry life cycle, 
and how market structure has developed over time. In its infancy, the soap and detergent 
industry had several large local producers. As time passed, more and more of the local 
producers dropped out of the market. After the industry matured, entry became more costly. 
Increasing entry costs meant few companies succeeded in entering the Norwegian detergent 
market after maturity.  
This thesis analyzes when the industry developed into a mature state, and how industry 
maturity affected entry. The effect of maturity on entry is largely analyzed through how 
effective advertising was in breaking down brand loyalty. Because brand quality is important 
in determining how effective advertising is, this thesis will attempt to explain how an 
incumbent may increase the cost of entry by making sure brand quality is similar or superior 
to potential entrant brands.  
The result of the analysis provided is that current market structure in detergent markets today 
is mostly the same as in the late 1930s. The explanation underlying this result is that the 
detergent industry at this point was maturing, and entry by new firms proved costly. In most 
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cases this high cost of entry has been effective in deterring new entrants, and hence market 
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Consumers in Norway have relatively few choices when shopping for laundry detergent. This 
lack of options may be illustrated by a simple comparison between Norwegian and European 
markets. In Norway, Lilleborg control the three major brands and has a market share of 80 
percent, while in Europe, three companies have a combined market share of approximately 76 
percent. How can we explain this asymmetry between Norwegian and European markets? 
Why does Lilleborg control such a large market share of the Norwegian market, while 
European markets are less concentrated?  
The times they are a-changing is the title of a song by American singer songwriter Bob Dylan. 
Relating mostly to the currents of youth rebellion in the United States in the 1960s, the song 
also captures the situation in Norwegian consumer goods markets at the time. Lilleborg had 
been the major actor in Norwegian detergent markets since the mid-1930s. In 1960, the EFTA 
agreement was signed, and trade barriers were about to be removed, opening Norwegian 
markets for imports from abroad.  Norwegian industry feared international competition, and 
the laundry detergent market was no exception.  
Following trade liberalization, major American companies attempted to enter the Norwegian 
market. After a massive advertising war, the American companies gave up, and the status quo 
prevailed. Why was the large American multinationals unable to enter Norwegian detergent 
markets in the 1960s? In the following thesis I will analyze the events and developments 
during the detergent war as well as developments before World War II in an attempt to 
explain why things in fact did not change, and why market structure today is largely the same 
as it was in the late 1930s.  
Developments in the detergent market seem to contradict standard economic theory. Where 
there are profit opportunities, firms will enter the market until profits are driven down to zero. 
Why have we not seen this development in the market for laundry detergents in Norway? In 
an attempt to explain this apparent asymmetry between observed market structure and basic 
economic theory, I will draw on several explanatory frameworks, such as industry life cycle 




Advertising is an important part of laundry detergent markets. In an attempt to explain current 
market structure I will also introduce theory that attempts to explain how advertising may 
affect market structure. 
Because Lilleborg has a long history as the market leader, it seems unlikely that the company 
has not taken steps to make sure they maintain their strong position. In this thesis I will thus 
examine how the market leader may have acted strategically to retain their market share.  
This thesis will be structured in five main chapters. This chapter provides an introduction to 
the problem and an overview of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the detergents 
industry in Norway and the World. Chapter 2 will also introduce how advertising is an 
important part of the value chain in laundry detergents. Chapter 3 presents theory on how 
advertising may affect market structure, industry life cycle theory and some insights relevant 
to analyzing entry deterring strategies that may have been employed. Chapter 4 takes a look at 
the Norwegian laundry detergent market in the light of theory introduced in the preceding 
chapter. Chapter 5 provides concluding remarks.  
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2 About Laundry Detergents 
This chapter will provide an introduction to history and current state of laundry detergent 
markets with an emphasis on the developments in Norway. Because of the special importance 
attached to advertising of laundry detergent, one section will also be devoted to this.  
2.1 Detergent Markets 
Markets for laundry detergents may be divided in two, one market for business customers like 
hospitals, large firms and the government, and one market for consumers where laundry 
detergent is sold over the counter in grocery outlets. This thesis will focus on the consumer 
market for laundry detergents.  
Laundry detergent is a so called Fast Moving Consumer Good (FMCG). FMCG‟s are 
typically goods sold at a low price and at low margins. Despite their low margins, FMCGs are 
sold in large volumes, hence giving rise to large profit opportunities (Gordon, 1999, p. 1). 
2.1.1 World Markets 
The detergent industry has been dominated by four firms worldwide. The European 
companies Unilever and Henkel, and American consumer good companies Procter & Gamble 
(P&G) and Colgate Palmolive. P&G recently purchased Colgate Palmolive‟s Western 
European laundry detergent business, reducing “the big four” in world detergent markets to 
three.  
Unilever is the traditional giant on the European stage. Unilever was formed when the English 
soap producer Lever Brothers merged with the Dutch margarine firm Margarine Unie in 1929. 
Most of Unilever‟s sales in detergents are made in Western Europe, America and many 
emerging markets. In 1961, Unilever estimated they accounted for 60 percent of world sales 
of soap and detergents, their position deriving from barriers to entry arising from economies 
of scale in production, research and marketing  (Jones, 2005, p. 11).  During the 1960s 
Unilever became increasingly concerned about the emergence of private label products. A 
private label product is a brand manufactured and sold by supermarket chains. After 
considering several responses, among them third party manufacturing of private label 
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products, Unilever decided to concentrate on supporting their own premium brands and leave 
the low end of the market to the private labels.  
Unilever fiercest competitor in detergents is Procter & Gamble, today the largest actor in the 
European market based on sales. P&G is largely focused on developed markets and its home 
market in the United States. Europe‟s third largest producer, Henkel, was originally a 
detergent company but later integrated vertically into chemicals. Ownership of the Persil 
brand is shared between Henkel and Unilever.  
The growth of private label in detergents was slow in Western Europe. Jones (2005, p. 138) 
argues that this is because detergents build up strong relationships with consumers through 
advertising and consistent performance in cleaning clothes.  
2.1.2 History of the Norwegian Market 
One of the characteristics of Norwegian detergent markets is Lilleborg‟s dominance. The 
market leader‟s position has also affected the sources available on laundry detergent market 
history. Most sources focus on Lilleborg. Because of this bias in existing literature the history 
of Norwegian laundry detergent markets provided here is, unfortunately, biased towards 
events occurring in and around the company from Sandaker, Oslo. 
The Growth of Lilleborg – The Detergent Market Before 1967 
In the 1920s, Lever Brothers was eager to expand its detergent business in Norway. Lever‟s 
plan was to increase its market share through ownership of Denofa and the Kongsten soap 
factory in Fredrikstad.
1
 Lever‟s plans of taking over Norwegian markets were not met with 
enthusiasm by Lilleborg‟s management. Their initial reaction was to fight back. Already in 
1926, Lilleborg had acquired a share of stock in Denofa from a German-Norwegian 
businessman (Sandvik 2010:398). When Unilever was established through merger in 1929, 
the newly formed soap and margarine giant pointed to Norway for further growth. After the, 
Lilleborg‟s stance in the battle for the Norwegian soap market changed from fight to 
cooperate. Lilleborg and Unilever negotiated an agreement where they would share ownership 
of Denofa, while Denofa owned a share of Lilleborg. This gave Unilever indirect control of 
                                                 
1
 Denofa was the world‟s largest producer of whale- and seal-oil, an important raw material used in production 
of margarine and soap. Its value to Unilever was therefore more than just the possible profits from sales of soap 
and margarine in Norwegian markets. 
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Lilleborg. Norwegian anti-trust authorities were concerned about Unilever‟s purchase of 
Norwegian business interests. After a long process through parliament and government, the 
Unilever purchase of Lilleborg stock through Denofa was approved by cabinet July 10th 
1931.
2
 The agreement between Unilever and Lilleborg gave Lilleborg the right to distribute 
Unilever‟s brands in the Norwegian market. In 1933 Lilleborg took over production of 
Unilever‟s product range in Norway.  
Henkel was the first company to introduce a specialized detergent in Norway, when they 
introduced their Persil brand in 1930 (Lund, 2008, p. 44). In 1935 Lilleborg followed by 
launching Blenda. According Ole Christian Moe, manager of Lilleborg‟s detergent business 
in the 1970s, the launch of Blenda meant a  “revolution in the detergent market” (Jacobsen, 
1976, p. 90).
3
 Among the inventions provided by Blenda was that it dissolved in water, 
relieving housewives of physically demanding scrubbing. Blenda also contained a bleach 
system to keep textiles white. Before 1940, Blenda passed Persil as the largest detergent in 
Norway (Lund, 2008, p. 78). For smaller factories the pressure of competition was getting 




During World War II Norway was occupied by Nazi Germany. With help from the occupying 
forces, German detergent producer Henkel won market shares in an environment that was 
characterized by lack of raw material (Lund, 2008, p. 81). The lack of raw material was so 
severe that manufacturers could not produce detergent of the same quality level as before the 
war. Both Lilleborg and Henkel sold their detergents without brand names in this period. 
After the war, the Persil factory in Moss, owned by the German company Henkel, was taken 
over by the Norwegian government as enemy property, and put into new ownership. Although 
the war ended, the shortage of raw material persisted until 1950.  
                                                 
2
 The agreement was accepted under somewhat strange circumstances. The Mowinckel-government, who 
supported Unilever‟s purchase of stock, lost a non-confidence vote on the subject May 8th 1931 and had to 
resign. The new government changed their stance and accepted the Purchase, but only after the Norwegian 
minister of trade, Per Larssen attempted to intervene. Larssen had been a strong spokesman against the purchase. 
Under unknown circumstances, Larssen took a sudden leave of absence to attend a fisheries meeting in Harstad 
before the crucial cabinet vote (Sandvik, 2010, p. 413). 
3
 My translation 
4
 One successful attempt was the cooperation between Goma in Kristiansund, and Jahre chemical factories in 
Sandefjord. The two smaller producers developed a highly successful detergent.
 
The cooperation between the 
two smaller factories came to an abrupt stop in 1945 when an English airplane was shot down and crashed in 
Jahre factories‟ facilities during World War II (Jensen, 1999, pp. 45-46). 
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In 1950 the detergent companies once again claimed they could produce detergent of the same 
quality as before the war. As a consequence, detergent producers reintroduced brand names to 
their products. After launching their brands in January, Blenda immediately won a significant 
share of the market. In this new market environment, Blenda and Persil were the two major 
competitors, while Tomtevask, a smaller producer, also had a significant market share. 
The Detergent War (1967-70)  
Believing further growth to be impossible, Lilleborg followed a strategy of defending its 
market position throughout the 1960s. Following the signing of the EFTA agreement in 1960, 
all import restrictions on industrial goods to Norway were lifted from January 1st. 1967.
5
 This 
opened the Norwegian laundry detergent markets for imports from abroad.  
Colgate‟s successful launch of their Ajax detergent in Denmark caused concern within 
Lilleborg. In 1965 the market leader was certain that Colgate had taken over Persil‟s position 
as their main competitor in many segments such as toothpaste, and that a launch in laundry 
detergents was imminent (Lund, 2008, pp. 188-189). In 1967, P&G and Colgate entered 
Norwegian detergent markets. For Lilleborg the detergent war was a matter of life and death. 
They were determined to do whatever necessary to make sure their American rivals did not 
achieve the 10 percent market share the market leader had calculated was necessary to break-
even (Lund, 2008, p. 48). Lilleborg succeeded and the two American giants withdrew their 
products in 1970. 
When the dust settled after the detergent war, Lilleborg reclaimed their position in Norwegian 
detergent markets. Already before war broke out in the detergent market, their main 
competitor through the 1950s, Persil experienced problems. P&G made a bid for the 
company, but the factory owners wanted to keep ownership within Norway (Lilleborg, 1983, 
p. 31). Lilleborg took over the Persil factory in 1967 in a move that gave them control over all 
the factory‟s brand names, among them the Persil Brand. Following the detergent war, 




                                                 
5
 According to Lilleborg‟s annual report for 1967, interest for several of their markets had been growing, but 
interest in the detergent market (their most profitable segment) was noticeable only after the EFTA agreement 
removed tariffs on industrial goods from 1967 (Lilleborg Annual Report (1967)). 
6
 Lilleborg purchased the majority of stocks in the Goma factory in Kristiansund in 1975 (Jensen, 1999, p. 83) 
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Towards a Modern Detergent Industry 
In the 1970s, Norwegian housewives climbed the barricades to fight for the environment. 
Public attention was drawn towards pollution in Norway‟s largest lake, Mjøsa. The 
environmental problems were caused by Eutrophication, a chemical process caused by high 
levels of nitrogen and phosphorous in water. Eutrophication causes excessive growth of algae 
that again disturbs the ecosystem through reduced oxygen levels. Phosphorous pollution in 
Mjøsa was caused by several factors, one of them was Sodium tri-polyphosphates (STPP), 
used as a builder in laundry detergents. With laundry detergents containing STPP as their 
enemy, local housewives campaigned for the use of detergents with reduced STPP content.  
Through the public program „Save Mjøsa‟, environmental minister at the time, Gro Harlem 
Brundtland, introduced a comprehensive program aimed at saving the lake from pollution. As 
a part of the program STPP was banned in detergents from 1988. The environmental action 
and later ban of STPP in detergents caused a significant effort within detergent companies to 
develop alternative detergent formulations without STPP. 
Throughout the 1990s liquid detergents became increasingly popular, and regular washing 
powder was replaced by micro powder; a more concentrated washing powder. At this time, a 
number of new product variants were introduced. This was consistent with a strategy where 
the market leader launched several product variants to fill all possible niches that might arise 
(Sørgard, 1997, p. 129).  In 1996 Lilleborg demerged with Denofa, 27 years after merging 
with their long term industrial partner. After separating the two companies, Lilleborg was to 
focus attention on the branded consumer business, while Denofa was to develop its oil 
business (Thoner, 2006, p. 72). 
In 1997 Lilleborg opened a new detergent factory in Ski, outside of Oslo. After the opening of 
the factory, Lilleborg shut down its detergent production by Akerselva in Oslo, closing the 
book on 164 years of soap and detergent production in the Norwegian capital. Today, 
Lilleborg‟s headquarters remain in the company‟s historical birthplace in Sandaker, Oslo 





The Second Detergent War 
In 2008, P&G again entered the Norwegian detergent market with their Ariel brand 38 years 
after they gave up establishing Tag as a brand. In addition to P&G, an American consumer 
goods company, Sara Lee, is present in the market with their Neutral brand, as well as Bio-
Tex. A number of private label products have also surfaced in the detergent market over the 
last decades.  
2.1.3 Current Market Situation  
In 2010, Lilleborg had the 3 most popular brands in the Norwegian detergent market. Despite 
its strong position, market shares have been declining as a consequence of increased 
competition. Figure 1 shows 
Lilleborg‟s market share, and how they 




Based on sales statistics from 2010, 
Sara Lee is currently the second largest 
company in the Norwegian detergent 
market. Their Neutral brand is 4
th
 in 
Norway based on sales. From the 
1960s, the Bio Tex brand had been sold 
in Norway by Tomten, and Jensen & co but the brand was still under ownership of Sara Lee. 
In 2001, Sara Lee took over the Bio Tex brand in Norway.
8
 P&G is also present with their 
Ariel brand. Since re-entry P&G‟s sales has been growing steadily. 
The four retail chain stores in Norway sell a total of 8 private label products in the laundry 
detergent market.
9
 As of 2010 their combined market share was just below 6 percent of total 
sales. In addition to private label products, a number of smaller international brands are sold 
in Norwegian markets. 
                                                 
7
 Data on market shares for the 2000s is provided by Lilleborg Chief Financial Officer, Stein Eriksen 
8
 Source: Cecilie Nyberg, Sara Lee Norway 
9
 Norgesgruppen (Unik, First Price), Coop (Coop, X-Tra, Coop Änglamark), Ica (Shiny, Skona, Euroshopper), 
Rema 1000 (Rema 1000, Landlord)  
1: Market share top 3 brands 
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Figure 2 shows market shares in the 
Norwegian detergent market for all 
brands excluding Omo.
10
 Despite a 
slowly declining market share the last 
few years, Lilleborg still occupy a 
remarkably strong position in the 
Norwegian detergent market. P&G‟s 
position has been steadily growing since Ariel‟s introduction in Rema 1000 stores in 2008 and 




In the 1800s, soap was a major growth industry. Because of similar uses of raw material, the 
soap industry largely grew out of the fats and oils industries.  The soap industry was 
characterized by a few large producers, and a large fringe of smaller factories producing soap 
for a local market (Sandvik & Storli).  
In Norway the development was similar to the rest of Europe. Production was initially local, 
but later developed to be national and later international. Lack of scale economies in 
production allowed small producers to survive in this environment. At the same time, the 
larger producers enjoyed significant economies of scale in advertising, distribution and 
transport (Sandvik, 2010, p. 391).  
In addition to using advertisement as a tool to increase its market share, Lilleborg grew by 
acquisition, taking over several smaller factories.
12
 Furthermore their agreement with 
Unilever constituted a significant resource, both by giving Lilleborg access to Unilever‟s 
brands and knowledge, and making sure they would not enter the market as a competitor. 
While the major competitors battled for the majority of the market in the period following 
World War II, smaller producers dropped out. Today Lilleborg is the only major producer of 
detergents in Norway (Lilleborg, 2009).  
                                                 
10
 Omo‟s Market share in this period has been around 50 percent of the total market. Data on market shares is 
provided by Lilleborg Chief Financial Officer, Stein Eriksen. 
11
 Surf, originally a Unilever brand, had a total market share of 3,3 percen in February 2011 (Source Stein 
Eriksen, Lilleborg) 
12
 Lade factories in 1926, DeNoFa (merger) in 1959, Persil in 1967, Goma/Ello in 1975 (Lilleborg, 2009) 
2: Market shares not including Omo 
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2.1.5 Lilleborg’s Strategies 
After brand names were reintroduced to laundry detergents in 1950, Lilleborg spent only a 
little time to regain their pre-war position in competition with Persil. After this, Lilleborg has 
been in a position where focus has been on maintaining its market share rather than continued 
growth. 
Throughout the 1960s Lilleborg focused of developing its products continuously through 
research and development. If in a given period of time, the product could not point to any 
improvements in the chemical formulae, advertisement would focus on new areas so as to 
give the impression of a product in continuous change for the benefit of the housewife.
13
 The 
focus on research and development is still an important part of Lilleborg‟s philosophy. Thoner 
(2006, p. 76) writes “Lilleborg‟s objective is to hold the number 1 and 2 positions in the 
categories in which they compete, and the strategy is top line growth, mainly through 
innovations”.  
Even though the Persil brand no longer is a significant presence in Norwegian consumer 
markets, control over this brand might have been an important strategic move by Lilleborg. 
The owner of the Persil brand in Europe, Henkel, lost control of their Norwegian assets after 
World War II. The Persil brand is still used by Lilleborg in 2011 but only in the business 
market.  
In a seminar organized by Norwegian competition authorities in 1993, Halvord Stensvold, 
Chief Executive Officer of Orkla, Lilleborg‟s parent company, is quoted as saying 
„[Lilleborg] developed a variety of products in the laundry detergent market to “fill all black 
holes”‟ (Sørgard, 1997, p. 127).14 By introducing many product variants, Lilleborg wanted to 
prevent profitable market segments to arise. Since Lilleborg established market leadership 
after brands were re-introduced after World War 2, the number of product variants has been 
increasing steadily. Compared to preceding periods, Lilleborg launched more products in the 
period leading up to the detergent war in 1967. The same pattern is observed in the period 
leading up to what may be termed the second detergent war in the first decade of the new 
millennium. Lilleborg‟s use of product proliferation as strategy of maintaining a dominant 
position is also well argued in Sørgard (1997). 
                                                 
13
 An example is the launch of the larger size pack of detergent made to save housewives time by reducing the 
amount of trips they had to make to supermarkets. 
14
 My translateion. In Norwegian, Stensvold said “fylle alle sorte hull” 
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2.1.6 Why Tag and Ajax Failed in 1967 
Lund‟s (2008) analysis of why P&G and Colgate failed to establish Tag and Ajax in 
Norwegian markets is based on an article by marketing manager of Lilleborg Ole Christian 
Moe. According to Moe, there were four reasons why Lilleborg won the war.  
1. Continuing product improvements 
2. P&G‟s test launch of Tag in two counties in Norway.  
3. The lack of TV advertisement in Norway. 
4. A mix of particularly Norwegian circumstances, among these a boycott keeping Tag 
and Ajax away from 20% of Norwegian grocery store outlets. 
Moe also highlight Lilleborg‟s cooperation with Unilever as an important factor (Lund, 2008, 
p. 39). Lund points to Lilleborg‟s marketing methods in her analysis, and the fact that 
Lilleborg accumulated significant knowledge in competing with other brands during the 
1950s and early 1960s.  
2.2 Advertising in Detergent Markets 
Advertising is an important part of Laundry detergent markets. Below we will see the 
development of advertising in the Norwegian market as well as a brief discussion on how 
advertising messages have changed over time. 
2.2.1 History 
In 1884 William Lever decided to wrap soap in fixed size packages.
 
In addition to wrapping 
and fixing the size of the product, Lever came up with the idea of giving the product a name. 
William Lever‟s „Sunlight‟ is largely accepted as the first industrial brand, and survives until 
this day. Following Lever‟s idea of branding of his soap product, advertising became an 
increasingly important part of soap markets. As laundry detergents later grew out of soap 
markets, advertising and brand identity persisted as an important part of the industry. Even 
today laundry detergents are some of the most heavily advertised consumer goods (Morse, 
Perry, & Lester, 1995, pp. 115-116). 
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The launch of Blenda in 1935 was accompanied by a massive advertising campaign to 
establish the brand as Norwegian housewives‟ first choice laundry detergent.15 Persil was 
passed by Blenda as the largest detergent brand before World War II. Lund (2008) points to 
three strategies used by Lilleborg to overcome Persil and gain market leadership before World 
War II. 
Marketing Blenda in the 1930s, Lilleborg drove around the country in a car demonstrating 
their new product for Norwegian housewives. It was necessary for the housewife to see how 
much easier it was to clean clothes with the new product. The campaign was a success, and 
the increase in demand for Blenda was largely attributed to this particular method of sales 
(Jacobsen, 1976, p. 90).  
In its advertising, Lilleborg used the fact that Blenda was a Norwegian product. The idea that 
Norwegian industrial employment was threatened by international imports was one of the 
causes for the so called „buy Norwegian‟ campaign. Both housewife organizations and the 
minister of trade, Alfred Madsen, spoke in favor of buying Norwegian products.
16
 By buying 
Norwegian detergents it was argued, housewives would support their husbands‟ employment 
and thereby secure their own income. Additionally Lilleborg used price war and massive 
advertising as a tool to capture market shares. Smaller producers, such as Goma, did not have 
the financial muscle to compete with the market leader under these circumstances (Jensen, 
1999, p. 41).  
During the 1950s, direct advertising through product demonstrations became more important. 
According to Lund, product demonstrations were a normal part of advertising in Norway 
during the 1950s. Still, Lilleborg was unrivalled with regards to the scale and ambition of 
their product demonstrations (Lund, 2008, p. 110). Throughout the decade several different 
forms of demonstrations were used. In the major cities, inhabitants were invited for tea in 
large halls where Lilleborg‟s products were demonstrated. Persil and Barnengen also used 
product demonstrations to reach potential customers, but the market leader seemed to be more 
original than their competitors both in content and the form of presentations. At some point 
during the 1950s, Lilleborg changed from the stationary Blenda-tea presentations to the more 
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 Lilleborg spent 250.000NOK in 1935 and 400.000 in 1939 on marketing and advertising for Blenda. (Lund, 
2008, p. 80)  In 2010 this amounts to approximately 8,25 MNOK , and 11,5MNOK  confer 
http://www.ssb.no/kpi/kpiregn.html 
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 By changing the form of presentations, the Oslo based company was 
hoping to reach more housewives in a shorter space of time. During this period it was a major 
point for Lilleborg to be first to introduce a detergent to housewives in a certain area. The idea 
of using a bus in advertising, was thus to „hunt‟ for places where Lilleborg could be first to 
give demonstrations.  As a supplement to the tea-presentations, Lilleborg visited potential 
customers in their homes to introduce their products and answer questions concerning 
laundry. While the bus presentations were mostly used in rural areas, the goal of the tea-
demonstrations and home visits was to visit every home in the major cities.   
During the early 1950s the idea that more products could help win a larger market share did 
not seem to be present within laundry detergent companies. Most producers had one brand, 
and focused their resources towards battling for market shares with other single brand 
producers. Lilleborg answered new market threats by marketing their Blenda brand for all 
purposes to all consumer groups.
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The threat of entry by Swedish synthetic 
detergent brand Rivitt in 1953 was the first event 
to cause the launch of a new product by the 
market leader (Lund, 2008, pp. 104-105). 
Lilleborg countered the Swedish threat by 
launching Sol in 1954. The Persil factory also 
launched synthetic brand Smili in 1958. The use 
of a wider variety of brands seemed to be more 
successful for Lilleborg than for its rival. While 
Sol helped Lilleborg increase the firm‟s total 
market share, the Smili brand took most of its market share from the Persil brand.  
In the 1960s automatic washing machines became more common in use. As popularity of 
automatic washing machines grew, it seemed like the old soap based detergents caused 
problems for automatic washing machines. Because it seemed risky making the radical 
changes necessary to solve these problems using their highly popular Blenda brand, Lilleborg 
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 Automobile presentations were the precursor to the bus presentations. In coastal areas where automobiles were 
not viable, Lilleborg used boats to get to potential customers 
18
 On example is when rival producer Barnengen marketed their “Tomtevask” successfully for soft wash, 
Lilleborg adjusted the advertising of Blenda to include a message saying Blenda was soft on textile, rather than 
introducing a new product. 
3: Market shares Persil (1950 and 1960) 
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launched Unilever‟s Omo-brand as a specialized detergent for automatic washing machines. 
Later Tomten launched the Dutch owned Bio-Tex brand specially designed for soaking. 
During the 1960s several brands surfaced. Lilleborg gradually focused efforts on giving 
different brands an identity directed at different kinds of consumers. Although products were 
differentiated with respect to who was supposed to buy them, the housewife was still the main 
target of all advertising. 
The cost of introducing a new brand in the detergent industry is high and by the 1960s, the 
European market was effectively saturated. As a consequence of the high cost of introducing 
new brands, manufacturers spent their resources on improving existing brands rather than 
introducing new ones. After the 1960s, few new brands were introduced while at the same 
time, formulations of existing brands changed constantly (Jones, 2005).  
2.2.2 Advertising Messages 
In the 1930s, industry represented employment, growth and wealth this was reflected in 
detergent advertising at the time. With the youth rebellion towards the end of the 1960s and 
early 1970s this role changed and people became more aware of negative effects of large 
industry. Advertising was hence given a less authoritarian role in communicating with its 
audience. One example is the use of Lilleborg‟s company name in advertisement. During the 
1930s the company name featured prominently in most ads, while it took a more withdrawn 
role in the 1960s and 1970s (Larsen, 1990, p. 170). 
Larsen argues that the goal of advertisement was to release consumers from the discomfort of 
modern society. To solve these problems the advertiser need knowledge about the consumers‟ 
needs, frustrations and dreams. Lilleborg‟s advertisements do not only introduce the potential 
consumer to a new good, but also communicate how to live in modern society by introducing 
models of how beauty and youth may be achieved in an attempt to increase the consumers‟ 
self-esteem and gain the favor of others. In his conclusion, Larsen states “Advertisement is no 
longer an authoritarian educator, but appear as a close friend giving us advice in the most 
intimate parts of life” (Larsen, 1990, p. 173).19 
Lund (2008) focus on how the housewife was the main target of Lilleborg‟s advertising in the 
1950-1970-period. When advertising Blenda, Lilleborg wanted to make sure Blenda was 
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 My translation 
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portrayed as the owners of the white wash technique. By using Blenda, your laundry will be 
whiter than everyone else‟s, was the message. Furthermore, appliance of Blenda would able 
the housewife to increase her status both within the family, and among other housewives.  
While retaining their main message of the status involved in using Blenda, Lilleborg included 
messages relating to the current market situation in their advertisement.
 20
 In the 1950s, Persil 
advertised their Henko brand and Persil as two different brands used for different purposes. 
Rather than introducing a new product, Lilleborg responded by stating Blenda could be used 
for both purposes. Similarly, Barnengen launched a specialized detergent that was supposed 
to be soft on textile. Lilleborg‟s response was by attaching a similar message to their Blenda 
product. With this move, Lilleborg extended Blenda to be used in the segment for fine textile, 
and at the same time making sure their competitor was not able to drain this market segment 
unchallenged.  
During the detergent war, Procter & Gamble used TV celebrity and journalist, Knut Bjørnsen, 
in their advertising. After complaints from Lilleborg employees, P&G and Bjørnsen were 
depicted negatively by news media because of Bjørnsen‟s role in endangering Norwegian 
employment by working for an international competitor. The use of a male expert in 
advertising detergents was also new. Lilleborg used female experts in an attempt to create an 
atmosphere of housewives giving each other advice on laundry in their advertisement. Lund 
(2008) argue that this may have had a negative impact on how Norwegian housewives viewed 
P&G and their Tag brand.  
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This chapter introduces a theoretical framework useful in understanding how laundry 
detergent industries function. The first, and most extensive part, focus on the effect of 
advertising and brand loyalty on market structure. Part 2 introduce a framework for analyzing 
the life cycle of an industry. The third and final parts introduce a framework relevant for 
understanding the strategies employed in detergent markets. 
3.1 Advertising and Market Structure 
In the following I will introduce three approaches to analyzing how advertising may affect 
market structure. Economies of scale, long terms effect of advertising and brand loyalty. I will 
also have a look at some empirical studies providing indications of how the different models 
may be useful in explaining real world markets. 
3.1.1 Product Differentiation 
A firm chooses to differentiate its products from products sold by competitors to increase the 
price of its products compared to other producers. If two products are homogenous, a small 
change in price will reduce demand for the expensive good and shift demand to the 
inexpensive good that poses largely the same characteristics. If two products are highly 
differentiated, a slight increase in the price of one of the goods will affect demand for this 
product only slightly since few consumers want to change their choice. The degree of 
differentiation between two products is measured by their elasticity of substitution. Two 
goods are closer substitutes the larger the magnitude of the elasticity of substitution between 
the two goods.  
Qualitatively there are two different types of differentiation. If products are horizontally 
differentiated, all consumers agree on the qualitative ranking of the two goods, but the price 
of the goods may be different and different consumers prefer different goods based on their 
level of income. When goods are vertically differentiated there is no agreed upon ranking of 
their quality, and consumers‟ ranking of the goods depends on preference. A characteristic 
causing goods to be vertically differentiated is colors, that consumers rate differently based on 
their preferences (Tirole, 1988, pp. 96-97). 
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In detergents markets, products are differentiated both vertically and horizontally. Different 
brand products are vertically differentiated in that they occupy different niches in the product 
market and are supposed to fill different consumer needs. Detergent products are horizontally 
differentiated as well. Private label products are mostly positioned in the low quality, low 
price segment of the market. Despite a general trend of private label products being 
horizontally differentiated and brands vertically differentiated in the top end of the market, 
this is a rough simplification.  
Firms may use advertising to differentiate their products in several ways. Sørgard (1997) 
divide the effect of advertising into three effects.  
The strategic effect of advertising influences the prices a firm may set. By advertising for its 
products, firms may increase consumers‟ willingness to pay for its products. This is the 
strategic effect of advertising. The strategic effect operates when advertising is designed to 
target consumers that already purchase a firm‟s product, by making them less sensitive to 
price changes. Graphically this may be explained as a tilt in a firm‟s demand curve. 
We say there is a direct effect of advertising when advertising stimulates demand for a firm‟s 
product compared to its competitors. This may also be called a „stealing effect‟, where 
advertising is used as a means of „stealing‟ market share from competitors – advertising 
increases demand for the product of the advertising firm by reducing demand for products 
sold by competitors. The direct effect will occur when advertising is directed at consumers of 
other firms‟ products. Holding aggregate demand in the industry fixed, the demand curve 
facing the firm advertising shifts up, while the opposite is the case for a firm that does not 
advertise. 
Advertising may also have a spillover effect, in that it affects the demand in the market as a 
whole. In this case advertising increases demand for a firm‟s product without negatively 
affecting demand for goods sold by competitors. This sort of advertising causes the industry 






3.1.2 Economies of Scale 
Fixed costs may give rise to economies of scale, and hence affect market structure. What 
determines the outcome is the size of the minimum efficient scale, the level of output that 
minimizes average cost (Varian, 2006, p. 437). If demand is large relative to minimum 
efficient scale, a competitive market is the likely result, while a minimum efficient scale large 
relative to industry demand a monopoly is more likely. It is important to note that this 
statement is relative. What matters is the scale relative to market size. For a given fixed cost, 
fewer firms will be viable as the size of aggregate supply is reduced. A smaller market will 
hence give rise to a more concentrated market structure. 
Advertising and Economies of Scale 
Martin (2010, p. 142), separate between three ways advertising may give rise to scale 
economies.  
1. The effectiveness of advertising may increase more than in proportion to the number 
of advertising messages that are sent out. In this case the cost of effective advertising 
decrease with the volume of advertising. 
2. Advertising might have to reach a threshold level to have any effect at all – there is a 
fixed cost level of advertising outlays necessary for advertising to have any effect at all. 
3. The cost charged by sellers of advertising space might be lower for large scale 
advertisers – as advertising outlays increase, the average cost decrease directly.  
Kaldor (1950) argue that advertising in fact affect market structure by increasing the scale of 
production and hence increase concentration. At the same time this depends on continued 
advertising. Should advertising levels drop, concentration will again be reduced caused by the 
fact that scale economies present in the industry are lowered. Other than the effect advertising 
have on the scale of production, advertising shift demand curves. 
Michael Spence (1980) explore this further. Due to the fact that advertising is designed to 
influence demand and therefore prices, it cannot be discussed entirely in terms of economies 
of scale or cost advantages in the normal sense. Yet scale economies, or advantages of size, 
are clearly relevant in establishing entry barriers. However, demand and prices are affected by 
advertising. The relevant measure of scale economies is thus to be found in the relation 
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between the firm‟s revenues and its costs per dollar of revenue, rather than in the relation 
between costs and output in physical units (Spence, 1980, p. 494). 
Advertising as an Endogenous Sunk Cost  
Advertising may give rise to economies of scale in the same way as fixed costs in production. 
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, there is a crucial difference. While we may say fixed costs 
in production are determined exogenously as a consequence of the technology of production, 
the level of advertising is a choice variable for the firm. In Sutton (1991) the endogeneity of 
sunk costs such as advertising and research and development is studied.  
While exogenously determined fixed costs will diminish in importance as market size 
increase, increased market size will cause escalating levels of endogenous sunk cost outlays, 
such as advertising, as firms compete for market shares. In a market dominated by exogenous 
sunk costs concentration will be reduced infinitely as market size increase. Sutton found that 
for markets where endogenous sunk costs are important, industry concentration will be 
bounded away from zero as market size increase.  
This has later led to a division of industries to type I and type II industries. Type I constitute 
industries where exogenous sunk costs dominate. Type I firms deal in products with no or 
slight horizontal differentiation. Type II industries on the other hand are characterized by a 
high level of endogenous sunk cost outlays. Here, products may be differentiated both 
horizontally and vertically (Martin 2010 p. 317). 
3.1.3 Depreciable Advertising 
When Unilever decided to enter the detergent market in the USA, they ran into difficulties. It 
proved difficult to enter a market where strong brands were already present. Experience from 
the detergent war in Norway in the late 1960s give an indication that P&G and Colgate might 
have encountered a similar problem. Despite spending large amounts on advertising, P&G 
and Colgate struggled to enter the market.  
Martin (2010) argues that mature markets may be particularly difficult to penetrate, since 
entrants must accumulate goodwill among consumers comparable to that of incumbents. If 
advertising have effects that last over time, an incumbent might have accumulated a large 
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stock of goodwill. An entrant might have to accumulate goodwill for some time after entry 
before demand is stimulated by advertising to the same extent as for an incumbent 
To model how a firm that uses advertising may accumulate goodwill over time, we use the 
following model presented by (Martin, 2010, pp. 426-427). 
We assume goodwill is built up by advertising, but that the stock of goodwill depreciates over 
time.    represents the stock of goodwill inherited from the past. The stock of goodwill for a 
firm advertising in period 1 and 2 is given by 
   (   )      
   (   )      (   )
    (   )      
The stock of goodwill in any given period is the part of goodwill inherited from the past that 
is not depreciated. Goodwill is also increased by current advertising. The general expression 
for goodwill in period t is given by 
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The quantity demanded in period t is a function of price and the stock of goodwill  
 (     ) 
Profit is given by  
 (     )  (    ) (     )         
Where, c is constant marginal and average variable cost. F is fixed cost.    is the cost of a 
unit of advertising, and    is advertising outlays in period t. 
The value of the firm is given by the present-discounted sum of profits in all future periods. 
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Advertising causes sales increases in all future periods. The optimal choice of advertising is 
found where the price of one unit of advertising in the current period equals the discounted 
and depreciated profit over all future periods from having an extra unit of goodwill in the 
current period. 
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 is the change in quantity sold in period     due to a marginal change in the amount of 
goodwill in period    . 
The fact that advertising have long term effects means that the effect of advertising today is a 
sum of all past advertising depreciated. Advertising today is naturally more effective than past 
advertising. How effective depends on the rate of depreciation. 
Advertising and Entry 
For a potential entrant, quantity demanded will depend on its own price and accumulated 
goodwill, in the same way as for the incumbent. In addition, demand for each firm‟s product 
depends on the price set by the other. The quantity set for the incumbent and the entrant is 
given by  
  (  
    
    
    
 )      (  
    
    
    
 ) 
Since he has no accumulated goodwill, the entrant‟s goodwill in the first period is equal to his 
advertising outlays. The incumbent will benefit more from accumulated goodwill since he has 
already accumulated a significant stock. An entrant has no accumulated goodwill initially and 
has to increase his stock through advertising over time. 
The effectiveness of accumulated goodwill in deterring entry works differently in different 
markets. In markets where the spillover effect or the strategic effect is dominant, advertising 
and accumulated goodwill is less efficient in deterring entry. In markets where the direct 




Empirical Evidence on Long Term Effects of Advertising 
If advertising is to have an effect on market structure through accumulated goodwill, as 
mentioned above, advertising must have some sort of a long term effect. Clarke (1976) survey 
a number of studies investigating possible long term effects of advertising, and conclude that 
90 percent of the cumulative effect of advertising on sales occur within 3 to 9 months of the 
advertisement. „The conclusion that advertising‟s effect on sales lasts for months rather than 
years is strongly supported‟ Clarke (1976, p. 355) asserts.  
He points out that most of the studies in his survey are done on mature industries. For the 
results in most of the studies surveyed by Clarke, it seems sales in the previous period are the 
most important factor deciding sales in the next period.  
In „Advertising in consumer goods: durability, economies of scale and heterogeneity‟, L.G. 
Thomas (1989) investigate the effect of advertising on sales in consumer goods industries 
using a model similar to Schmalensee (1978b) as discussed below, and a depreciating 
advertising model as the one above. Thomas (1989) uses four stylized facts about consumer 
goods industries to find if depreciable advertising or brand loyalty, introduced below, is 
important in determining demand.
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In real world consumer goods industries, best-selling brands advertise most heavily, and 
advertising rises with sales toward long-run equilibrium (Thomas, 1989, p. 167). 
Consequently, the depreciable advertising model is not consistent with observed 
developments in consumer goods industries, Thomas argues. Despite not being consistent 
with observations of consumer goods industries, observations of large advertising outlays by 
newly introduced brands imply a secondary role for depreciable advertising. 
Thomas finds that assuming a long term effect of advertising, as necessary in the depreciable 
advertising model leads to results not consistent with his set of observations for consumer 
goods industries. Homogeneous brand quality, an assumption necessary in depreciable 
advertising model, results in increasing returns to scale in advertising. Increasing returns to 
scale may be statistically rejected. Further on, it give rise to an unstable equilibrium that is not 
consistent with observed developments in consumer goods markets (Thomas, 1989, p. 185). 
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 1. There is large, persistent and generally stable heterogeneity in sales and advertising levels of various brands 
within an industry. 2. Brands having larger sales are advertised more. 3. Brands having larger sales exhibit lower 
ratios of advertising to sales. 4. Brands are advertised more, ceteris paribus, during a brief period immediately 
after market introduction (Thomas, 1989, pp. 166-167). 
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By imposing the false restriction of brand homogeneity, advertising will serve as a proxy for 
brand loyalty, who is suppressed. In this case, returns to quality and returns to advertising are 
confused. This will lead to erroneous conclusions about the implications of advertising alone, 
as the effects of brand loyalty are attributed to advertising (Thomas, 1989, p. 186). 
Thomas estimated the depreciation rate for advertising on an annual basis to exceed 80 
percent, while returns to scale from advertising are estimated to be decreasing (Thomas, 1989, 
p. 187). Thomas thus concludes that the depreciable advertising model is not consistent 
developments in real world consumer goods industries. 
3.1.4 Brand Loyalty 
Consumers don‟t usually have full information about the quality of a good. In determining the 
quality of a good, a consumer may search for the best quality brand or purchase a brand to use 
it and hence determine by experience which brand she prefer. This has led to the division of 
goods into two different types; search goods, and experience goods.  
According to Nelson (1970, p. 311), consumers‟ lack of information about the quality of 
goods have profound effects on market structure for consumer goods. Where consumers have 
to rely on their experience of trying a good, monopoly power will be higher than for search 
goods. In a later paper, Nelson (1974) argued that advertising provides useful information 
about product quality. He argues that misleading advertising cannot be effective for search 
goods, while it can be for experience goods since consumers cannot verify the content of the 
advertisement without purchasing the product.  
High quality brands are more likely to be advertised more heavily, ceteris paribus, since the 
value of a sale of a high quality brand is larger. This is because the consumer is more likely to 
purchase the brand again. Because advertising is more effective for brands of high quality, 
consumers may use advertising as a measure of brand quality, and they should hence buy the 
most heavily advertised product. The logical content of advertising should hence not factor 
into the consumer‟s considerations when choosing which product to buy (Thomas, 1989, pp. 
175-176). 
Schmalensee (1978b) develop a formal model for investigating experience goods. In his 
model two opposing forces are central (Schmalensee, 1978b, p. 498). 
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1. High quality brands by definition enjoy high repeat-purchase probabilities. This 
increases the present value of returns from advertising and, ceteris paribus, yields them 
high market shares in equilibrium 
2. High quality brands have high unit costs if the unit cost advantage enjoyed by low 
quality sellers is larger than 0. This makes advertising less profitable for them and tends, 
ceteris paribus, to raise their equilibrium shares.  
Schmalensee argue that for industries with higher returns to scale in advertising, the second 
effect is increased and may contribute to a situation where the second effect dominates the 
first, and poorer brands receive larger market shares. In this perverse equilibrium consumers 
behave as if they had read Nelson 1974 and purchase the brand most heavily advertised 
(Schmalensee, 1978b, p. 486).  
However, Schmalensee‟s model is based on strong assumptions on consumer behavior. He 
points out consumers probably have better memories, and that qualities may be endogenously 
determined by firms with different cost functions.  
Testing the Brand Loyalty Model 
In the study mentioned in chapter 3.1.3, Thomas (1989) also introduce a brand loyalty model 
where each brand loses customers at a rate based on advertising levels and intrinsic brand 
quality. Brands also lose customers that drop completely out of the market and may attract 
completely new customers (Thomas, 1989, p. 179). In this model brands that are repurchased 
more often will experience a higher present value of sales, because selling a good today might 
make the consumer buy the product again at a later stage. If advertising can be used to induce 
consumers to buy a product, producers of high quality products will have a larger incentive to 
advertise because of the added benefit that making a consumer buy your product once may 
result in a series of consecutive purchases. High quality brands will hence be advertised more 
heavily, ceteris paribus. Due to these linkages among brand quality, brand loyalty and brand 
advertising, consumers may use relative levels  (and not the logical contents) of advertising as 
signals of relative product quality (Thomas, 1989, pp. 175-176).  
In the case of heterogeneous brand quality, where consumer repurchase goods based on past 
consumption experience, a stable long run equilibrium exists. This is consistent with 
observations made in consumer goods industries. From the starting point of zero sales, both 
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sales and the stock of advertising rise toward this equilibrium. Sales rise more rapidly than the 
accumulated stock of advertising, leading to a falling ratio of advertising to sales over time, 
consistent with observations. The level of advertising also rises over time, despite falling 
advertising-sales ratios. This is consistent with observations of consumer goods markets. 
Thomas‟s estimations are done in mature industries close to long run equilibrium. Therefore, 
brand loyalty, not the short term effects associated with advertising accounts for most of sales. 
The results of advertising effectiveness may thus be different in infant industries. 
The Effect of Advertising on Brand Loyalty 
Shum (2004) studies how advertising may be used to break down brand loyalty by reducing 
switching costs in the breakfast-cereals market. His findings indicate that “an important effect 
of advertising in the breakfast-cereals market is to encourage “switching” behavior at the 
household level, which overcomes brand loyalty by persuading households to try brands they 
have not purchased recently”  (Shum, 2004, p. 264).  
While brand loyalty may provide significant advantage to incumbents, advertising may be 
effective in breaking down brand loyalty and hence making entry into markets with loyal 
consumers easier for potential entrants. Shum thus argue that advertising may work to 
facilitate entry so that more brands may exist in the market than would be feasible in the 
absence of advertising. 
In a related study, Ackerberg (2001) examine the effects of different advertising messages. 
Experienced consumers are consumers that have tried a brand in the past, while inexperienced 
refer to consumers that have not tried a brand. Ackerberg find that “advertising that provides 
information on inherent brand characteristics should primarily affect inexperienced consumers 
of a brand, while advertising that creates prestige or association should affect both 






3.2 The Dynamics of Market Structure 
The equilibrium approach to analysis of market structure says that firms will enter and exit 
the industry until each firm‟s profits are equal to zero. This theoretical way of modeling entry 
and exit does not match the observed patterns of entry and exit in real world markets. Because 
of the difference between observed entry and exit patterns and the traditional theoretical 
explanation of entry and exit, a literature describing market structure in a dynamic context has 
emerged (Martin, 2010, pp. 325-326). 
3.2.1 Industry Life Cycle 
The life cycle of an industry, as described by Agarwal and Gort (1996), may be divided in 5 
stages describing the pattern of entry and exit in an industry. 
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In stage 1 (the initial period) initial entrants may come from related industries, or enter the 
industry through vertical integration. In stage 2 entry rates are higher, and may be subdivided 
into an initial phase of accelerating entry, followed by a phase of decelerating entry. At this 
stages firms experiment in design and product prices in an attempt to find consumer needs 
and to discover their willingness to pay. Stage 3 is a transformational plateau in the number of 
sellers. Unlike stage 2, stage 3 does not occur in all industries.  
Net Exit 
In stage 4, the industry experience net exit. Here the industry „settles down‟ on a dominant 
design. In stage 4, innovative activity is shifted to improve productive efficiency. At this 
point, the industry is characterized by more mechanized production and the development of 
capital assets. The main production in the industry is centered in „the oligopolistic core‟ while 
firms that are leading „the efficiency race‟ gain market share. Minor producers drop out of the 
market.  
The Mature Industry 
In stage 5, the industry has matured and there is no longer a consistent trend in entry and exit 
patterns. Firms in the oligopolistic core compete among themselves. In addition there exists a 
small group of firms at the edge of the market. The composition of firms in the fringe changes 
over time, but the group of firms in the oligopolistic core is fairly stable. Firms may (rarely) 
move from the fringe to the core, but firms on the verge of making this move may find that 
firms in the oligopolistic core apply entry deterring strategies in order to keep new entrants 
out of the oligopolistic core. 
Sunk Costs 
The level of entry also depends on the level of the sunk cost. Larger sunk costs causes lower 
net entry and also lower net exit from the industry. Entry involves a higher cost, and hence 
fewer firms decide to enter the industry. Once a firm has entered the industry, the larger level 
of cost that is sunk works to discourage exit. 
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3.3 Price Competition and Strategic Commitment 
To analyze the strategies employed by Lilleborg in the period after the detergent war, it is 
useful to look at theory explaining the effect of strategic investment. To fully understand the 
implications of such investment, some insight into price competition is also necessary. 
3.3.1 Price Competition 
Price competition is usually modeled by using one of two models, developed by Antoine 
Augustine Cournot and Joseph Bertrand respectively. Cournot and Bertrand competition is 
usually depicted as competition in either quantities or prices. The latter case may yield a 
competitive equilibrium even though there are only two firms in the industry, while the 
former leads to less tough competition in the market with a lower produced quantity and 
higher prices. The Cournot model is introduced formally in the appendix. 
Tirole (1988, pp. 223-224) points out that the two models should not necessarily be depicted 
as rival models, but two complementary approaches, each depicting industries with different 
cost structures. The Bertrand case is a better approximation for industries with fairly flat 
marginal cost curves while industries with fairly steep marginal cost curves are more 
accurately modeled using the Cournot approach. 
The fact that Bertrand competition may lead to a competitive equilibrium even when there are 
only two firms indicate that the outcome in this model is more appropriate where there are 
tough competition. The Cournot model may therefore be more appropriate in markets where 
price competition are softened by such things as capacity constraints (or more accurately 
choices of scale), product differentiation and repeated interaction between firms.  
In Bertrand competition decision variables are strategic complements, and reaction curves are 
upward sloping. In Cournot competition reaction curves are downward sloping and decision 






3.3.2 Games of Commitment 
A firm may choose to maximize its profits in the face of future potential entry by acting 
strategically. A firm may then make an investment before the potential entrant makes his 
decision to enter the market. For such a strategic move to be efficient it must be both 
irreversible and observable for the potential entrant. A more formal introduction to this model 
is provided in the appendix. 
The effect of such an investment in the future period may be divided into two effects. The 
effect investment has on the potential entrant‟s profits, and the effect it has on the 
incumbent‟s future actions.  
Entry Deterrence 
Firms engaging in entry deterring behavior may want to make some investment with the goal 
of reducing a potential entrant‟s profits down to zero and hence make him opt out of entering 
the market.  
How such a firm should invest to deter entry depends on the effect the investment have on the 
profits of the potential entrant. If the effect is negative in that it reduces the potential entrant‟s 
profits, the incumbent should invest more in order to deter entry.
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 If investment increases the 
entrants post entry profits, the incumbents should invest less to deter entry. 
Accommodated Entry 
In some cases it might not be feasible for the incumbent to deter entry. The incumbent still 
have an incentive to act strategically in order to maximize its post entry profits. The actions 
depend crucially on the form of competition prevailing in the given market.  
If markets are characterized by Cournot competition, the decision for the firm should be the 
same as in the entry deterrence case. An entry deterring strategy will also maximize profits in 
the case of accommodated entry. This is because, in Cournot competition, decision variables 
are strategic substitutes. If the incumbent choose a high quantity, it is in the entrant‟s interest 
to choose to produce a low quantity. 
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 „More‟ or „less‟ investment relates to a comparison between how the firm should invest compared to a 
situation where strategic considerations are not a part of the incumbent‟s decision.  
30 
 
In the case of Bertrand competition, the entry deterring strategy and the accommodated entry 
strategy are opposites. Since decision variables are strategic complements in Bertrand 
competition, the entrant will choose to produce a high quantity if the incumbent chooses to 
produce a high quantity. The optimal strategy for the accommodated entry case under 
Bertrand competition is hence the opposite of what it would be if the firm was successful in 
deterring entry. 
3.3.3 Monopolization by Brand Proliferation 
A firm that produces one good may increase their profits by differentiating their products 
from products sold by competitors. In markets where firms produce several varieties of a 
similar product, a dominant firm may also use a strategy called monopolization by brand 
proliferation to maintain a strong position in the market. The idea is that the dominating firm 
can introduce several variants to fill all possible niches that may develop in a market, and 
hence deter potential entrants from entering profitable market niches. This was first studied by 
Schmalensee (1978a) in the ready-to-eat cereals industry in the USA. 
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4 Explaining Market Structure 
The following will take a closer look at the Norwegian laundry detergent market in the light 
of theory introduced in chapter 3. In the first section I will discuss the industry life cycle of 
the Norwegian detergent market. In this discussion I will attempt to find when Norwegian 
detergent markets matured, and when they were in earlier stages of development.  
The maturity of the industry in different stages of history will be important when I, in part 2 
of this chapter, discuss the effectiveness of advertising at different stages in its development. 
Differences in effectiveness of advertising over the life cycle of the industry will be used as a 
major variable in understanding attempted entry into the industry.   
I will also discuss how the timing of trade liberalization acted in concert with the 
development of the industry over the life cycle. I will explain how this relationship may be 
important in explaining current market structure, as well as how this framework may be used 
to analyze similar consumer goods industries.  
I will also have a look at how Lilleborg‟s strategies and environmental regulation (The STPP 
ban) may have affected market structure. Finally I will have a brief look at current detergent 
markets. 
4.1 Maturity of Detergent Markets 
A good first step in explaining market structure is by looking at entry and exit on the basis of 
the industry life cycle model introduced in chapter 3.2.1. This model describes an industry 
from infancy to maturity with regards to design of the specific good, how firms interact in the 
market, and by data on entry and exit. 
Detergent Design 
As described in Chapter 2, washing powder became popular among housewives for doing 
laundry in the 1930s. After the 1930s, housewives have mostly used powder detergents for 
their laundry. The growing popularity of automatic washing machines in the 1960s did not 
change the dominant detergent design significantly, and neither did the environmental 
concerns in the 1970s and 1980s. Changes in the chemical composition of detergents were 
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radical, but housewives in the 1990s still used washing powder for their laundry. Although 
washing powder is arguably the dominant design for laundry detergents, the emergence of 
liquid detergent has been significant in the 1990s and 2000s. For the sake of an industry life 
cycle analysis, we may take washing powder as the dominant detergent design even though 
matters get more complicated as we approach the 2010s. 
Industry Structure 
From an industrial organization perspective the history of detergent markets in the late 1930s 
and 1950s provide strong indications that a stable oligopolistic core of detergent producers 
was developing. Competition between Lilleborg, the Persil factory and Tomten had definite 
traits of oligopolistic competition as the firms acted and reacted to decisions made by the 
others. Despite attempts from both Colgate and Procter & Gamble to enter the Norwegian 
market, the oligopolistic core remained largely unchanged for 70 years. The only lasting 
change occurred in 1967 when Lilleborg acquired the Persil factory and the oligopolistic core 
changed to a duopoly consisting of two firms. Similar to the discussion about detergent above, 
the situation seems to get more complicated as we approach present time. New entrants such 
as P&G, private label products and other brands have made a significant impact in detergent 
markets even though competition is duopolistic, and the core consists mainly of Lilleborg and 
Sara Lee, while P&G may be on the verge of breaking into the duopolistic core of the 
industry. 
Entry and Exit 
The development on industry entry and exit provide a similar development for Norwegian 
detergent markets as that provided by industry life cycle theory. Figure 5 shows the 
development of soap and detergent producing firms in Norway between 1909 and 1990, and 
is constructed using data from Ragnhild Rein Bore & Tor Skoglund (2008), Statistics Norway 
(1915) and Statistics Norway (1933 -1996) on the number of firms producing soap and 
detergents in Norway. 
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The period before World War II 
was characterized by high net 
entry into the industry. Our data, 
starting at 1827 show an 
increasing trend in the number 
of firms. After a peak in 1940, 
the industry experienced net 
exit, a trend that continue until 
1994, which was the final year 
Norwegian industrial statistics 
counted soap and detergent producers as a separate group. The data on entry and exit seems to 
be generally supported by the history of the industry as described in chapter 2, as well as 
histories of individual companies that operated in the market (Lilleborg (1983), Jensen 
(1999), Unger (1997)). 
Based on industry life cycle theory, net exit occurs after the industry has found the dominant 
design. The fact that net exit occurs after 1940 support the suggestion of washing powder as 
the dominant detergent design.  
A Note on the Data 
The fact that the data used is from the amount of firms producing detergents rather than 
selling detergents is a significant 
weakness, excluding for example 
imports from abroad. Despite this 
weakness the history of the detergent 
industry in Norway seems to indicate 




Another weakness of the data is that 
Statistics Norway did not always 
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 Henkel is mentioned as one firm importing detergents before this time, but later established their own 
production facilities in Norway, the Persil factory in Moss. The historical sources mentioned in this thesis 
mention no other importers of detergents in Norway before 1967. 
5: Firms producing soap and detergents (1827-1994) 
6: Development of the number of firms including small 































































count firms employing only one person after 1949, while data before 1949 contain no 
breakdown of how many firms were „large‟ and how many were „small‟. Due to this, data 
before 1949 include firms employing only 1 person, and data after this include only firm‟s 
employing 5 or more people. This helps explain some, but not all, of the sudden drop in 
producers after this point. Because small firms were not always counted after 1949, the count 
for large firms is preferred to give a more complete illustration of the development over time. 
In Figure 6 we see that the slope of the trend lines after the peak in 1940 is not significantly 
different. The data provided above should therefore provide sufficient for discussing entry 
and exit from a perspective of industry life cycle theory. 
Industry Maturity 
After finding a dominant design for laundry detergents in the mid-1930s, a mature industry 
slowly evolved in Norwegian detergent markets. World War II interrupts the analysis of the 
development from a perspective of competitive interaction, but the general trend in net exit is 
persistent over time after 1940, as well as the dominant design. After markets normalized 
following World War II, the market situation seems to have been fairly stable for 50 years, 
with the notable exception of the detergent war, indicating a fairly mature industry after this 
point. 
4.2 Effectiveness of Advertising 
In the following I will analyze the effectiveness of advertising at different points in the 
industry life cycle. This will prove useful in determining why the market structure have 
remained largely unchanged for the last 70 years, and in turn help explain current market 
structure.  
4.2.1 The Rise of Blenda 
Below we will see why Lilleborg was successful in establishing Blenda as a brand in 
competition with Persil in the late 1930s. At this point in the industry life cycle a dominant 
design had yet to emerge, and the general trend was net entry to the industry. Advertising was 
at this point highly effective in increasing demand. The effectiveness of advertising in 
increasing demand was an important factor explaining why Blenda soon was established as 
the major brand in the Norwegian detergent market. 
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Figure 7 shows the development of advertising expenditure at Lilleborg in the period between 
1920 and 1935. The data is collected from Jacobsen (1976) and is adjusted for cost of living 
for 1922. The sudden jump in advertising expenditure at the end of this period is due to the 
launch of Blenda. Since Lilleborg‟s archives from this period are incomplete, I have not been 
able to find data showing the development of sales for Blenda and Persil in the period 
following the launch of Blenda. Despite this, we do know that Blenda, 4 years after the launch 
in 1935 had a 70 percent share of the market for white wash. These developments indicate 
that the growth of 
Blenda may be 
attributed to Lilleborg‟s 
advertising at the time. 
Since the laundry 
detergent market yet 
had to develop into a 
mature state, the 
studies by Thomas 
(1989) and Clarke 
(1976) ruling out long 
term effects of 
advertising does not the possibility that advertising may be important in determining market 
structure. The mentioned studies take up the importance of advertising in mature industries. 
As we have seen in chapter 4.1. the laundry detergent market was still in its infancy, 
indicating a more significant role for advertising than in the mature industry case. 
At the time Blenda was launched there was already a brand on the market. Despite of the fact 
that there was an incumbent present in the market, Blenda was highly successful in entering 
the market. Because of data restrictions, we may not with accuracy describe the effect of the 




7: Lilleborg advertising (1920-1935) 
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Large Spillover Effects 
Due washing powder still being a new product in Norway, many housewives had yet to try a 
powder detergent. Because there was a large pool of consumers that had yet to try a detergent, 
they had not developed any brand loyalties yet. Brand loyalties may have been associated 
with the old ways of washing clothes. By using product demonstrations in their advertising, 
Lilleborg effectively broke down any loyalties attached to the old ways of doing things. After 
inducing housewives to try the new product, repurchase was most likely guaranteed based on 
the superiority of powder detergent over soap. 
Due to the data restrictions already mentioned we do not have exact numbers confirming the 
potential for spillover effects in early detergent markets. The existence of such effects seem 
obvious both from an intuitive point of view, and based on industry history.  
Industry history introduced in chapter 2 tells how Persil and Lilleborg travelled around the 
country introducing their powder detergent to housewives. This form of advertising was used 
because the firms meant it was crucial to show how the new product functioned. Prevailing 
until the 1960s the fact that the firms used this form of advertising indicates that they believed 
there was a pool of housewives that needed to be introduced to powder detergent.  
Due to the fact that powder detergent was a relatively new product, Persil might not have 
established significant brand loyalties yet. Thus spillover effects might have been significant 
enough for Blenda to capture a 70 percent market share without „stealing‟ market share from 
Persil. 
Breaking Persil’s Brand Loyalty 
If Persil in fact had built up brand loyalties by the time Blenda entered the market in 1935, 
Lillborg may have been efficient in breaking down Persil‟s position.  
As indicated in Shum (2004), advertising may be used to break down brand loyalty and 
induce trial purchases. Advertising may then be used to help induce entry into an industry. 
The description provided of Blenda‟s advertising during this period in chapter two definitely 
indicates that this might have been an effect of their advertising. Handing out samples, for 
example, is a direct way of reducing consumers cost of trying a new brand of an experience 
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good. The „buy Norwegian‟ campaign might also have proved efficient, by playing on 
economic nationalism prevailing at the time to induce housewives to switch brands.  
Once convinced to try a new brand, the quality of the new good must convince the customer 
that it is of superior quality to induce repurchases. Since Blenda had a 70 percent market 
share it was obviously successful in inducing repurchases. This may strengthen the 
impression that the view held by detergent manager Moe regarding Blenda‟s qualities were 
shared by Norwegian housewives in the 1930s. 
Although we are unable to confirm the above using data from 1930s detergent markets, the 
history of the industry and previous research introduced in chapter 2 definitely seems to 
confirm the view introduced here. As we have seen, it is also consistent with theory. 
4.2.2 The Failure of Tag and Ajax 
During the late 1960s Colgate and P&G attempted to enter Norwegian detergent markets 
without success. In the following I will attempt to explain why they were unsuccessful.  
In explaining why I will look at how, as opposed to the situation facing Blenda in 1935, Tag 
and Ajax faced a market where spillover effects from advertising were less likely. Because the 
industry had now matured, they were also facing brands with a strong base of loyal 
customers. To enter the market they thus had to use advertising in breaking down brand 
loyalty to induce trial purchases. After the initial trial purchase, the entrants needed to 
convince consumers that the quality of their product was significant enough to make the 
consumer buy the product again.  
While the situation facing Blenda in 1935 allowed for relatively easy entry, I will argue that 
the three conditions above all made entry into the Norwegian detergent market more costly in 
1967. In addition to the above points comparing the situation in 1967 with 1935, I will discuss 






Before diving into the analysis we start by establishing a general overview of the 
developments during the detergent war. First, the entrants were mainly P&G and Colgate, 
while the Dutch brand Bio-Tex was introduced earlier by Norwegian producer Tomten. 
Estimates made by Lillborg indicate that a 10 percent market share was necessary for the 
entrants to break-even. To reach this point, the entrants would either have to attract new 
customers, or „steal‟ enough customers from incumbents to achieve a 10 percent market 
share.  
Figure 9 shows market shares for 
Lilleborg‟s brands before and 
during the detergent war.
24
 If the 
goal of P&G and Colgate‟s 
advertising was to break down 
brand loyalty of Lilleborg‟s brands 
they were successful to a certain 
extent. Lilleborg‟s total market 
share fell by approximately 15 
percent during the detergent war.  
Figure 10 decomposes Lilleborg‟s market shares before and during the detergent war. 25 The 
jump in “other” brands after 1967 is due to Lilleborg‟s purchase of the Persil factory. For the 
other brands, Omo and Coral are 
fairly stable while Sol and 
Blenda have a general downward 
trend throughout the detergent 
war. It thus seems that the 
Entrants took their market shares 
mostly from Blenda and Sol, 
while Omo remained fairly 
strong. Based on the above data, 
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 Data on market shares collected from Lilleborg marketing plans (1965-1970)  Lilleborg Museum Archives  
25
 Lilleborg Marketing plans 1965-1970, Lilleborg Museum Archives 
8: Lilleborg market share (1964-1970) 
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we know that Lilleborg lost, on aggregate, approximately 15 percent market share during the 
detergent war. This loss came mostly from Blenda and Sol, while Omo market shares 
remained fairly stable. The decline in market share for Sol and Blenda was 14,4 and 15,6 
respectively, a combined loss of 30 percent. The total market share for Lilleborg is thus 
maintained at a relatively high level due to the purchase of the Persil factory in 1967.  
In the following we will largely focus on Blenda, Omo and Sol in addition to the entrant 
brands in an attempt to explain events and outcomes of the detergent war. 
Lack of Spillover Effects 
By inducing consumers that are not loyal to a brand to buy your product, spillover effects may 
be a useful tool in making entry less costly. 
For the detergent war and 
the preceding period, data 
shows that the total market 
size in tons of laundry 
detergent is relatively stable 
(Figure 8).
26
 There is a 
clear and relatively constant 
upward trend, where the 
only deviation is a slight 
increase in 1967 followed 
by a decrease the next year. 
This may be attributed to consumers stocking up on detergents due to a sudden decline in 
prices. Data about Lilleborg‟s advertising introduced below, clearly show an increase in 
advertising expenditure by the market leader. As P&G and Colgate entered, they also 
contributed to increase advertising outlays significantly. From this we may argue that the 
relatively stable upward trend in detergent sales seems to be largely unaffected by advertising 
outlays. Aggregate demand in the industry thus seems to be largely unaffected by total 
advertising outlays, reducing the scope for spillover effects from advertising.  
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 Figure 8 is constructed using sales and market share data collected from Lilleborg marketing plans (1965-
1970) from Lilleborg Museum Archives  





























Furthermore, Lilleborg and Persil stopped their direct advertising during the early 1960 
because they now meant most housewives had been introduced to powder detergent. At the 
time of entry, P&G and Colgate were largely unable to attract customers that did not already 
consume a powder detergent.  
We may thus assume P&G and Colgate could not enjoy any spillover effects from their 
advertising, and that they were unable to attract customers that had yet to be exposed to a 
powder detergent. Thus, all sales had to come at the expense of an incumbent brand.  
We will analyze the effectiveness of the entrants in stealing market shares in two steps below. 
First we will discuss if they were able to induce trial purchases, before we analyze  their 
effectiveness in securing repurchases from consumers making the initial purchase. 
Inducing Trial Purchases 
Initial trial purchases relates to the effectiveness of a firm to induce consumers to try an 
experience good. Since the consumer cannot know the quality of the good without purchasing 
it, advertising is used as a tool to induce the initial purchase. Market research performed by 
Lilleborg at the of Tag‟s test launch seems to indicate that the reason housewives bought Tag 
was that the image of the product signaled effectiveness and modernity (Lund, 2008, p52). 
The fact that housewives bought Tag based on perceived differences, not quality differences 




Looking at relative advertising levels (figure 11) two points of interest arise.
27
  
First, we see that advertising outlays for Tag and Ajax are significantly larger than for the 
incumbent brands. From Shum (2004) we know that advertising may be used to break down 
brand loyalty. This data strongly indicate that breaking down brand loyalty is more costly 
than it is for an incumbent to maintain it. The large advertising outlays for Tag and Ajax 
seems to have been successful in breaking down incumbent brand loyalty. On the other hand, 
the large levels of advertising seem to have been successful in breaking down brand loyal 
only for two of the three major brands.  
This turns our attention to the 
second point arising on the basis of 
the above data. Relative advertising 
levels among Lilleborg brands does 
not seem to provide a reasonable 
explanation for the decline of Sol 
and Blenda compared to Omo. The 
fall in market share for Blenda and 
Sol may thus not be explained by 
differences in advertising outlays 
compared to Omo. The lower advertising outlay for Sol may indicate a drop for Sol compared 
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 Lilleborg Marketing plans 1968, Lilleborg Museum Archives. Advertising outlays for Tag and Ajax are based 

































12: Advertising Blenda, Sol, Omo 1964-1970 
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to Omo. Looking at advertising levels for Lilleborg‟s major brands throughout the detergent 




Based on these data, two questions arise. Why did Omo‟s market share remain largely 
unchanged despite relatively low advertising outlays compared to Blenda? Second, if the goal 
of advertising is to break down brand loyalty, why is the fall in market share similar for Sol 
and Blenda, when Blenda was advertised more heavily?   
Sol‟s relative strength in comparison to the more heavily advertised Blenda may be explained 
by looking at detergent prices. From Figure 13 we see that Sol was clearly horizontally 
differentiated from the other major brands. While Blenda lost large market shares, large 
advertising outlays might have prevented 
the fall from being more significant. For 
Sol, the fact that this brand was positioned 
at the lower end of the market compared to 
the other brands may explain why the drop 
in market share was not more significant. 
Despite being a lower quality brand than 
Tag and Ajax, some of Sol‟s customers 
remained loyal due to the fact that it was 
cheaper.  
Still, it remains to explain Sol and Blenda‟s decline relative to Omo. Despite being the most 
heavily advertised among the incumbent brands, Blenda lost significant market share, while 
Omo, with lower advertising outlays remained fairly unaffected by the massive advertising 
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Above we have been able to explain why Sol and Blenda fared relative similarly in the face of 
attempted entry. Still, it remains to be explained why Omo had a fairly stable market share 
throughout the detergent war while Blenda and Sol suffered significant losses.  
In Lilleborg‟s market plans from this period it is clear that Tag was of superior quality to 
Lilleborg‟s products at the time Tag was test launched (Lund, 2008, p. 51). If Tag thus was 
able to convince housewives of making trial purchases, they should also be able to induce 
repurchase. As we have seen in the case of Blenda and Sol, the entrants were largely 
successful in breaking down brand loyalty. The relative strength of Omo may thus be 
explained by the fact that Lilleborg, after the test launch of Tag, embarked on a major 
development program aiming to strengthen the quality of their products. This program led 
Lilleborg to introduce an improved formulation for Omo before Tag was launched 
nationwide. The formulations of Blenda and Sol saw were left unchanged.  
Figure 11 shows the development of 
high quality brands Omo, Tag and 
Ajax and low quality brands Blenda 
and Sol during the detergent war. The 
loss of market share of low quality 
brands is the same as the gain for high 
quality brands. The high quality entrant 
products Tag and Ajax, were 
successful not only in inducing trial 
purchases, but they were also were successful in inducing repurchases.  
The developments for the first two years of the detergent war suggests that the entrants were 
largely successful both convincing consumers of making trial purchases and by inducing 
repurchases based on product quality. Why does the trend seem to stop after 1968? The lack 
of further growth by the entrants may be explained by two events in the detergent market.  
First, Lilleborg improved the quality of Sol and Blenda in 1968. This may have reduced 
incentives to switch brand for housewives making a trial purchase of the entrants‟ product. 
14: High quality (Omo, Tag, Ajax) and low quality brands (Blenda 













When consumers of Blenda and Sol did not experience an increase in quality when trying the 
new brand their incentives to switch brands were reduced. This in turn caused market share 
for Sol and Blenda to stabilize. 
Second, we know from Lilleborg‟s marketing plans at the time that the advertising outlays for 
Tag and Ajax were significantly larger in 1967 and 1968 than in 1969 and 1970. As the 
entrants‟ advertising outlays were reduced, they convinced less housewives of making trial 
purchases. Persistent brand loyalties for incumbent brands were thus more important in 
determining demand, and the entrants‟ growth was halted.  
Tag and Ajax‟s lack of success in taking market share from similar quality products, such as 
Omo and the improved versions of Blenda and Sol confirm the importance of product quality 
in the laundry detergent market. Omo‟s strength, despite significantly lower advertising 
outlays in comparison to Tag and Ajax, suggests that to break down brand loyalties of strong 
incumbent products, an entrant has to offer a significant improvement in product quality. The 
case of Omo suggests that advertising is largely ineffective to break down brand loyalty at all 
for products of similar quality. 
Blenda and Sol lost significant market share in the period where Tag and Ajax could provide 
a significant improvement in product quality but only for a while. When the quality of Sol and 
Blenda were improved and thus more similar to Tag and Ajax, the entrants‟ growth halted. 
For Blenda advertising outlays may have contributed to restricting the loss in the period 
where the entrant were able to provide an improved product, while being horizontally 
differentiated was able to maintain some of Sol‟s market share despite offering a lower 
quality detergent. 
The Effect of Simultaneous Entry 
Above we have seen that the growth of Tag and Ajax were halted in 1969, a factor that might 
have contributed significantly to their failed attempt at entry. This is, however, not the full 
story. Sol and Blenda lost approximately 30 percent of their market share from 1964- 1970. 
For the point of view of the entrant this should prove more than enough to make entry 
profitable, under the condition that a 10 percent market share was necessary to break even. In 
the following we will analyze how the number of entrants might have proved a deciding 
factor in deterring entry by P&G and Colgate. In addition to the international entrants, we will 
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also include Bio-Tex in the analyses, the Norwegian brand introduced by Tomten a few years 
before the detergent war.
29
  
Figure 16 show the development of 
market share for the three major 
entrants in the period 1967-1970.
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Based on Lilleborg‟s 10 percent break-
even estimate for entrants, there should 
be room for at least two entrants in the 
Norwegian market. As Bio-Tex was 
the only brand to successfully enter the 
market despite the entrants‟ success in 
capturing almost 30 percent 
market share, the number of 
entrants might be important in 
explaining the failure of Tag and 
Ajax. First, Bio-Tex was the only 
brand to achieve a 10 percent 
market share (Figure 15). This 
seems to confirm that Lilleborg‟s 
estimate of a 10 percent market 
share being necessary to break-even is correct. 
Despite the presence of Bio-Tex, P&G and Colgate captured approximately 17 percent of the 
total market, enough for one entrant to break into the market. Assuming a 10 percent being 
necessary to break-even, the 17 percent achieved by Colgate and P&G was not enough for 
two firms to enter. When P&G and Colgate did not reach this point before Sol and Blenda 
was improved, this may explain why their entry attempt proved unsuccessful.  
Based on the above, the entrants were largely successful in breaking down the brand loyalties 
necessary to enter the Norwegian market. Because two entrants had to compete for the market 
shares they were able to „steal‟, none of them achieved the 10 percent break-even point 
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 Both P&G and Colgate introduced a second brand during the detergent war, but these brands did not achieve 
the same success as Bio-Tex, Tag and Ajax 
30
 Bio-Tex was launched in Norwegian markets before liberalization in 1967, but experienced most of its growth 
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16: Total market share Bio-Tex, Tag, Ajax 1967-1970 














necessary before Lilleborg improved the quality of Sol and Blenda. That two companies 
attempted to enter the Norwegian market simultaneously may be a significant factor 
explaining their eventual failure. 
Laundry Detergent Prices  
According to economic theory, a concentrated market structure is often related to reducing 
welfare compared to a competitive market. In the following we will see how detergent prices 
were affected by the entry of Bio-Tex, Tag and Ajax, and make some statements about the 
effect Tag and Ajax‟s entry had on economic welfare.  
In Figure 13 we saw that prices on laundry detergents during the detergent war were fairly 
similar across brands, except for Sol that was differentiated horizontally at a lower price. That 
prices were fairly similar across brands suggests that Tag and Ajax did not possess significant 
cost advantages over the 
incumbent to make price 
reductions a part of their strategy 
in capturing market shares. Rather 
than working as a tool for more 
efficient entrants to break into the 
market, price reductions for 
Lilleborg‟s brands in the period 
1967-1968 (Figure 17) instead 
contributed to deterring entry. 
This drop in prices indicates that Lilleborg was able to extract some rents from the market 
before Tag and Ajax entered the Norwegian market.  
Since Tag and Ajax‟s entry caused prices to fall, their attempt at entry improved consumer 
welfare in the short run by giving consumers more choices and lower prices. Because we do 
not know the consumers‟ elasticity of demand we are unable to determine if the reduction in 
prices resulted in a transfer of wealth from producers to consumers or a reduction in 
deadweight loss. Furthermore, since the reduction in prices might have been important in 
deterring Tag and Ajax‟s entry, the initial price drop may have contributed to Lilleborg being 
able to extract rents in the market in the long run. While increasing consumer welfare in the 
short run, the fall in prices during the detergent war helped deter entry, causing higher prices 
















and reduced choice in the future. The negative long term effect thus cancels the positive effect 
in the short run, indicating that the reduction in prices in fact was not positive for consumers. 
A full analysis of the welfare effects of market structure in laundry detergent markets is 
outside the scope of this study. Based on data for the detergent war and the preceding period, 
it seems the unsuccessful entry attempt did not provide significant welfare improvements in 
the long run, as it was used as a tool of deterring entry. 
Summing Up the Detergent War 
In the end, Tag and Ajax failed in gaining enough loyal customers to buy their products. 
Above we have seen how the entrants were successful in breaking down brand loyalty and 
inducing repurchases of their products. Because there were two entrants in the market at the 
same time, they were not able to break down enough of incumbent brand loyalty to make 
simultaneous entry plausible. Despite breaking down a significant part of incumbent brand 
loyalty, their this lack of success may be explained either by their lack of success in tempting 
consumers to buy their products, or their lack of success in inducing repurchases of their 
brand once consumers were convinced to try it once. The former relates to the success of 
advertising, while the latter relates to product quality. With regards to Omo the quality of the 
incumbent product proved a significant factor in maintaining the brand‟s market share. 
Despite significant losses for Blenda and Sol, large advertising outlays and horizontal 
differentiation may have limited the losses for the incumbent, hence contributing to deterring 
entry.  
 
4.2.3 1935 and 1967 – A Comparison 
The situation facing Blenda in 1935 stands in stark contrast to the situation facing Tag and 
Ajax in 1967. Different circumstances in the detergent market at different points of industry 
maturity are important in explaining Tag and Ajax‟s failure compared to Blenda‟s success.  
Blenda‟s owners enjoyed significant spillover effects by introducing their detergent to 
housewives in a market were no detergent yet was established. Tag and Ajax on the other 
hand were facing a market where consumers had already established loyalty to a brand. All 
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sales had thus to come at the expense of other brands, requiring costly advertising outlays to 
break down brand loyalties.  
While Tag and Ajax faced a brand of similar quality in parts of the market, the part of the 
market where they were able to provide an improved product, they faced significant brand 
loyalties. Heavy advertising was used to defend Blenda‟s position, while the horizontal 
differentiation of Sol might have reduced the entrants‟ ability to take significant market shares 
from these brands. From the entrants‟ point of view, Lilleborg seems to have been more 
effective in communicating with consumers through advertising messages in 1935 than for 
Colgate and P&G was in 1967.  
While Blenda, according to Lilleborg sources, provided a superior quality detergent compared 
to all alternatives available in 1935, Tag and Ajax had to compete against an incumbent of 
similar quality in Omo. While Sol and Blenda were of inferior quality for a while, Lilleborg 
updated their formulations and increased product quality during the detergent war. As we 
have seen it has proven difficult to break down brand loyalties for products of similar quality, 
contributing largely to Tag and Ajax‟s failure.  
Further, Colgate and P&G‟s apparent lack of cost advantages reduced the scope for price wars 
as a tool to push Lilleborg out of the market. The fact that entry was attempted simultaneously 
by two firms in 1967, at a time when the industry experienced net exit, also had a negative 
effect on their eventual success. 
Above we analyze why P&G and Colgate were unsuccessful in entering Norwegian laundry 
detergent markets in the late 1960s. Because of strong brand loyalties, entry was costly after 
the industry had matured. Since breaking down brand loyalty is costly, and in the case where 
products are of similar quality merely impossible, successful entry to the Norwegian laundry 
detergent market has been limited to the entry of Bio-Tex.  
This lack of entry explains why current market structure is similar to the market structure 
prevailing in the 1930s, when the dominant detergent design was „discovered‟. The analysis 
provided of the detergent war in the late 1960s does not rule out entry, it indicates that entry 
require special circumstances such as an entrant providing a product of improved quality. In 
the case where an entrant is able to introduce an improved product, entry will still be costly. 
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Despite offering a high quality product, successful entry is not at all certain, explaining why 
entry into the Norwegian laundry detergent market has been so limited. 
4.3 Brand Loyalty and Trade Liberalization 
Above we have seen the effects industry maturity have on entry costs in the Norwegian 
laundry detergent market. The increase in the cost of entry caused by significant brand 
loyalties may make entry into mature industries prohibitively expensive.  
Since entry into the Norwegian detergent market occurred following a wider liberalization of 
trade, the above analysis may be relevant for explaining market structure in similar industries. 
Generally, 2 conditions are necessary for a situation like the one occurring in the Norwegian 
laundry detergent market to arise. 
1. The goods sold in the industry must be experience goods, and brand loyalty must be 
important in determining demand.  
2. The industry must have matured before trade was liberalized, in this case 1967. The 
entrant must thus not be able to provide an improvement on the dominant design.  
In such industries, the market structure prevailing in the industry at its infancy is more likely 
to prevail in current markets if: 
1. There are no spillover effects from advertising in the industry hence market structure 
is more likely to be unchanged in markets for necessities than for luxury goods.  
2. Dominant product design has remained largely unchanged after liberalization.  
The product may have changed, but the more often changes occurs, the more likely it is that a 
potential entrant have been able to use the change in the dominant design to enter the market. 
For the laundry detergent market, changes in product formulations occur relatively often, and 
the real question with regards to changes in market structure relates to whether there have 
been changes in the dominant design that have not immediately been filled by the incumbent. 
As mentioned above, there were several industry specific causes explaining why entry into the 
detergent market proved costly. The interrelationship between advertising effectiveness and 
trade liberalization following the EFTA agreement might still be an interesting topic for 
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studying similar industries. Investigating market structure in industries that fit the above 
description is outside the scope of this study.  
4.4 Other Entry Barriers 
After the detergent war, the dominant design and brand loyalties for Lilleborg was largely 
stable. Still, the STPP ban and Lilleborg‟s brand proliferation strategy may be interesting to 
analyze in the context of explaining current market structure. 
Environmental Regulation 
Imposing a ban on the use of STPP in detergents may effectively deter entry from all 
producers that cannot produce a detergent without STPP. Norway was one of very few 
countries that imposed such a ban in the 1980s. This may have been a significant barrier to 
entry.  
Among the big 4, Lilleborg‟s 
ownership of the Persil brand and 
close ties with Unilever reduced 
potential competition in 
Norwegian markets to Colgate 
and P&G. Having already failed 
to enter Norwegian markets in the 
late 1960s, P&G and Colgate‟s 
hunger for attempting entry in 
Norwegian markets is likely to 
have been low.  
Among the big 4, environmental considerations were a part of Henkel‟s strategy. They were 
hence the most aggressive in developing non-STPP detergents. Figure 13 taken from Morse et 
al. (1995, p. 112) and shows the availability of non-STPP detergents in Western Europe. In 
the early 1990s, approximately 70 percent of the population in Western Europe had access to 
non-STPP detergent. The STPP ban is unlikely to provide a significant barrier to entry at this 
point, since most detergent producers thus have a non-STPP brand available. Due to the 
discussion above about product quality, it would be necessary to know the quality of STPP 
























substitutes among all potential entrants to know if the STPP ban provided a significant barrier 
to entry. Morse et al. (1995) also provide data on which countries imposed restrictions on 
STPP use. In the 1980s, the countries that imposed restrictions or an outright ban were 
Sweden, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Austria, Switzerland and Belgium. In 
several of these countries Henkel control the Persil brand, and the early development of non-
STPP may be due to Henkel‟s efforts in developing non-STPP detergents.  
The development of non-STPP detergents in Western Europe in the early 1990s is evidence 
that the STPP ban cannot have proved a significant barrier to entry in Norwegian detergent 
markets in the 1990s. In the 80s we may not draw such conclusions. Henkel was the most 
aggressive in developing alternatives to STPP, and in Norway, Lilleborg owned Henkel‟s 
major brand thus providing an important barrier to entry from Henkel. We may not conclude 
that restrictions and later ban on STPP use in detergents provided a significant barrier to entry 
into Norwegian detergent markets in the 1980s, but based on the data introduced above we 
most certainly cannot rule out that the ban on STPP may have had entry deterring effects. 
Monopolization by Brand Proliferation 
Already in chapter 2 we established that Lilleborg have been following a strategy of 
monopolization by brand proliferation. Figure 19 and figure 20 shows Lilleborg and other 
firm‟s product launches since 1989.31 The number of variants launched by Lilleborg follows 
the number of launches by other market participants closely. This surely strengthen the view 
that Lilleborg‟s statement of launching several product varieties to „fill all black holes‟ is 
followed by the firm in the market as well.  
According to  Thomas (1989) only the number 
1 and 2 brands in a FMCG market usually 
provide significant rents for their owners. This 
should indicate that Lilleborg, already 
controlling the top 3 brands, has no incentive to 
launch new products based solely on profit 
opportunities that may arise in market niches. 
The incentive for launching many product varieties under the condition that only the number 
                                                 
31
 Constructed based on data on new product launches provided by Lilleborg CFO, Stein Eriksen 
















































1 and 2 brand is profitable should thus not be to increase profits, but rather to reduce the 
probability of other firms taking over the number 1 and two positions by entering the market 
through a profitable niche.  
The most interesting part of analyzing such a strategy is whether or not it is profitable. Based 
on the framework for analyzing strategic investment as an entry deterring strategy the 
profitability of such a strategy depends on the 
firm‟s reaction curves, and on the success of 
the strategy. Lilleborg have clearly chosen a 
strategy, where the major laundry detergent 
producer, overinvest to deter entry, a so called 
Top Dog Strategy. Such behavior should 
indicate that the market leader either believes 
decision variables to be strategic complements, 
or that it will be able to deter entry.  
Assume that only the number 1 and 2 brands are profitable in Norwegian laundry detergent 
markets we may argue that the goal of a brand proliferation strategy is to reduce the 
likelihood that a potential entrant is able to locate a niche that may grow enough so as to take 
over the number 1 and 2 positions. If an entrant was to be successful in establishing itself as a 
number 1 or 2 brand, the investment made in deterrence will not increase incumbent profits, 
since only the number 1 and 2 brands are profitable. Decision variables are thus strategic 
substitutes, indicating that Lilleborg in fact is convinced they will be able to deter entry.  
Based on Lilleborg‟s current market position, successful entry deterrence seems plausible, 
leading us to the analysis on current detergent markets.  
4.5 Current Detergent Markets 
The strategy employed by Lilleborg indicate that they are convinced they will be able to deter 
potential entrants from taking over the number 1 and 2 positions in the Norwegian detergent 
market. During the second detergent war, Omo‟s market share seems to be fairly stable, while 
Blenda is losing significant market share. This is similar to the situation in the late 1960s and 
may indicate that Blenda is not of the same quality as Omo and Ariel. Lilleborg‟s concern 
should thus be with improving the quality of the number 2 product.  











Figure 16, showing an excerpt from the market share figure introduced in chapter two 
showing only Blenda and Ariel indicate the developments of the last few years and shows 
how. If the trend continues we will see 
Ariel take over Blenda‟s position as the 
number two brand in Norway. 
Concerning the welfare effects of such a 
change, the last 10 years have definitely 
provided consumers with more choices 
in the detergent market. If the entry 
during the second detergent war has had 
the same effects on prices as it did in the 
late 1960s, the entry occurring in 
Norwegian detergent markets after 2000 will cause a transfer of wealth from detergent 
producers to detergent consumers or a reduction in deadweight loss depending of the 
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Laundry detergent is an experience good, meaning that consumer experience in using and 
verifying the quality of the good is important in determining demand. This causes brand 
loyalty to be important in determining final sales. We have seen that Lilleborg was able to 
build up strong brand loyalties for their products after the launch of Blenda in 1935. As 
laundry detergent settled down on a dominant product design, the industry slowly matured, 
and several firms exited the detergent market. That Blenda, launched in 1935, and Omo, 
launched in 1952, are still the two most sold laundry detergents in Norway is a good indicator 
that their brand loyalties have been strong in the mature detergent market. 
Because of these strong brand loyalties, entry into the Norwegian detergent market is costly. 
This is especially the case after markets matured. We have seen that two major multinationals 
have been deterred from entering the Norwegian laundry detergent market in the late 1960s. 
Their lack of success may be explained by the fact that breaking down brand loyalties was 
very expensive. Despite introducing products that provided an improvement in quality to 
some of the incumbent brands, they were not able reach the break-even point.  
For explaining current market structure, the general observation that entry into the mature 
detergent market is expensive is important. The failed entry attempt by P&G and Colgate in 
the late 1960s may thus have provided an important signal to potential entrants that this 
market was impenetrable. Despite their failure, the attempt of Procter & Gamble and Colgate 
was also a matter of circumstances surrounding this particular attempt of entry. The fact that 
Lilleborg was quick to improve their Omo brand and later Sol and Blenda meant the potential 
market available for the entrants was smaller. Since there were two entrants competing for a 
limited share of the market may also be important in explaining their failed attempt at entry.  
The evolution of the detergent industry as described by the development of entry and exit 
patterns is important in explaining current market structure. Similarly, strong brand loyalties 
persist, making entry into the industry costly. In the case of attempted entry into the 
Norwegian detergent market, entry proved to be prohibitively costly, even for multinationals 
like Colgate and P&G that no doubt had the financial muscle necessary to break in to the 
Norwegian market had they been convinced it would prove to be profitable in the long term.  
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While strong brand loyalties may explain why entry has not occurred in mature detergent 
markets, special circumstances surrounding the Norwegian market may explain why entry did 
not occur in while the market was still developing. Tariffs on soap may have proved a barrier 
to deterring entry by foreign companies before strong brand loyalties had been built up. Once 
trade was liberalized, the brand loyalties associated with the market leader‟s brands proved 
difficult to break down. 
Despite strong brand loyalties, we have also seen that they may be broken down, and entry 
may be possible if the entrant can provide an improvement in product quality over incumbent 
brands. This explains why Tag and Ajax were close to breaking into Norwegian markets in 
the late 1960s. Despite the observation that entry seems plausible in the case where a higher 
quality product is provided, entry requires large advertising outlays. Because of this, entrants 
may still find entry to be unprofitable despite offering a higher quality product. 
Explaining current market structure is the main task of this thesis. In doing so, I have chosen 
to analyze the history of detergent markets, and why entry has proved not to be successful in 
the past. Since market structure is similar today as it was in the late 1930s, entry barriers 
arising after this point in the history of the detergent market should provide most important 
factor in explaining current market structure. The general conclusion is that strong brand 
loyalties are the main reason why market structure today is largely unchanged for the last 80 
years. It is also important to emphasize that it is possible to break down brand loyalty, as we 
have seen in the case of the detergent war. To maintain its position it is thus important for the 
incumbent to make sure the quality of their product high enough. If this is the case, entry is 
not only costly, but as we have seen in the case of the detergent war, prohibitively costly.   
Entry barriers arising after industry maturity in the Norwegian laundry detergent market is 
found to be the main reason why market structure has been largely unchanged for the last 70 
years. The initial market structure that developed in the industry before maturity is thus found 
to be largely unchanged. With regards to explaining the market structure that developed in the 
industry before maturity, available data indicate that Lilleborg‟s advertising is an important 
factor. Due to lack of data available about the Norwegian laundry detergent market in the 
1930s the certainty surrounding our conclusions about the infant industry is not the same as 
for our analysis in the mature industry. Based on the available data we may be fairly certain 
about why entrants were unable to enter the Norwegian detergent market after 1940. With 
regards to explaining developments before maturity lack of data results in less certainty 
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surrounding the causes of why Lilleborg ended up being the number one producer of 
detergent in the 1930s. Based on available data and the industry history, Lilleborg‟s launch of 
Blenda in 1935 and the accompanying advertising campaign seems to be the main factor in 
explaining the initial market structure that developed at the time before the industry found 
their dominant design and evolved into a mature industry.  
A more concentrated market structure is usually associated with reduced economic welfare.  
This study has not focused on welfare analysis, but developments of price levels during the 
attempted entry by Tag and Ajax indicate that Lilleborg have been able to extract some rents 
from the market. Because we do not know the consumers‟ elasticity of demand we are unable 
to conclude whether the reduction of prices is a mere transfer of wealth from consumers to 
producers, or if there is deadweight loss associated with the higher prices charged.  
When it comes to future developments in the Norwegian detergent market, the situation seems 
more complicated. Based on the analysis above we know that consumers should expect high 
quality laundry detergent in spite of the seemingly dominant position of the market leader. 
High entry from private label and international brands the last few years indicates that a new 
detergent war is being fought in the Norwegian laundry detergent market. Based on the 
analysis of the history of the laundry detergent market provided above we do know that to be 
successful, the entrants should offer a product providing improved quality over incumbent 
brands. At the same time they should expect significant amounts of advertising outlays to 
break down incumbent brand loyalty. If entrants are successful in these endeavors, times may 
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Appendix A – Cournot Competition 
The simplest form of Cournot competition is the duopoly case in a one shot game, with 
homogenous products as described by Sørgard 1997. The firm‟s decision variable, quantity of 
production, is not known to other when they each make their production decision. The market 
price is determined as a function of total quantity produced, given by 
     (     ) 
   and    are quantities chosen by firm 1 and 2 respectively. Assuming constant marginal 
cost, and zero fixed costs, the profit function for firm 1 is given by 
       (     )         
The market equilibrium is the situation where both firms choose their optimal level of 
production, given the other firms level of production. Since the market price depends on the 
firm‟s output decision, each firm will take into account the effect increased quantity will have 
on the market price. Each firm will also take into account the production decision of the other 
firms when making its production decision. Each firm‟s reaction function satisfies the first 
order conditions of their profit functions,  
   
   
                  
Solving for Q1 we get firm 1s reaction function which is a function of the other firms 
produced quantity.  
   
         
  
   (  ) 
Similarly for firm 2: 
   
         
  




The relationship between the decision variables of the two firms is given by 
   




   
The interpretation of this is that the larger quantity firm 1 chooses, the smaller quantity firm 2 
should choose. We say the decision variables are strategic substitutes, in the respect that when 
the opponents increase his decision variable we have incentive to lower ours.  
The equilibrium is found by inserting firm 2‟s reaction function into firm 1‟s. This yields the 
following expression 
   
        





Solving for Q1 
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Appendix B – Games of Commitment 
A firm‟s decision may be related to how it may maximize its present profits. Firms also care 
about future profits, and may take action in a bid to maximize their expected profits in the 
future. When a firm makes a decision so as to affect its own or its rival‟s future decisions, we 
say that the firm is acting strategically. 
Strategic commitment 
In the following I will introduce model in an attempt to understand a firm‟s strategic behavior. 
The starting point is a two stage game where investment is the firm‟s decision variable. The 
model will attempt to understand how a dominant firm may use investment as a tool to 
increase its future profits in the case where there is a potential entrant. The presentation will 
follow Sørgard 1997‟s presentation of the strategic commitment model. 
The two stage game 
At stage 1, a firm will make an investment decision involving some sunk cost. At stage two in 
the game, the firm will either continue to operate as a monopolist, or compete a la Bertrand or 
Cournot. The presentation will follow Sørgard 1997.  
 
Two stage game (Sørgard, 1997 p. 132) 
For a firm‟s decision to have a long term strategic effect (an effect on potential entrant‟s 
future behavior), the following two conditions must be met 
1. The decision must be observable by the other firm 





Price- or quantity competition 
(Firms meet in the market) 
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The strategic effect of a decision by the firm may be categorized into an indirect and a direct 
effect.  
- The indirect effect works will change the way the incumbent are likely to act in the 
future in the face of entry. An example is actions making price war a profitable 
strategy for the incumbent in the case of entry. Through changing its own optimal 
strategy in the face of entry the incumbent hopes to change the potential entrants‟ 
entry decision, or the entrants‟ behavior post entry. 
- A strategic decision may also have a direct effect by changing potential entrant‟s 
decisions directly. The direct effect may work in two different ways. The incumbent‟s 
actions may: 
1. Change the costs of the potential entrant. 
2. Affect the market size the entrant faces. 
When acting strategically, the firm will choose its strategy based on what it sees as the 
ultimate goal of the strategy. There are two possible scenarios 
1. The firm thinks it might be able to deter entry, and hence choose a strategy that will 
reduce the potential entrants post entry profits to zero. 
2. The firm is unable to prevent the firm from entering the industry. In this case it might 
still be in the interest of the firm to act strategically to increase its own post entry 
profits. 
We will examine both strategies in the following. 
Entry Deterrence 
We are assuming a firm is able to deter entry by the potential incumbent by making an 
investment involving a sunk cost K. K is observed by the other firm before the entry decision 
is made at step two of the game. In step one of the game K is a decision variable for firm 1, 
while    and    is the decision variable for the two firms in stage two of the game, should the 
new firm decide to enter the industry. When the decision of x is made, K is known, so that     
and    are functions of K. 
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To deter entry, firm 1 has to choose K such that the post entry profits of firm 2 is equal to 
zero. Firm 2‟s profit function will have the form: 
  (    
 ( )   
 ( )) 
To find how firm 1 may choose K to make entry unprofitable for firm 2, we differentiate firm 
2‟s profit function with respect to K.  
   
  
 
   
  
 
   
   




   
   




 The first expression 
   
  
 on the right hand side is the direct effect the incumbent‟s 
investment. As mentioned above, the direct effect may change both costs and the market 
size facing the potential entrant. 
 The second expression, 
   
   
   
 
  
, measures the strategic effect. K changes the incumbent‟s 
behavior in the second stage of the game. The indirect effect measures how this change in 
behavior affects the potential entrants post entry profits.  
 Assuming firms choose the optimal level of their decision variable we may skip the third 
part of the right hand side expression in our analysis, since this includes the marginal 
change in the firm‟s decision variable, that under optimality necessarily have to equal 0. 
The total effect on the entrant‟s profits depends on the sum of the direct effect and the indirect 
effect.  
The incumbent want to choose a level of K so that the entrant‟s profits are reduced to zero. 
What this means for the actual choice of K, depends on qualitative effect the investment has 
on the entrant.  
 If  
   
  
  , increased investment by the incumbent reduces profits for the entrant. In 
this case the incumbent should invest more than he would do in the absence of 
strategic considerations to deter entry by the potential entrant. 
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 In this case where 
   
  
   the incumbent should invest less to deter entry, compared 
to the situation where strategic considerations are not a part of the incumbents 
decision making. 
The above model describes how a firm should act in if its strategy is to reduce the potential 
entrants post entry profits to 0. Still, it might be the case that the incumbent is not able to 
reduce the entrant‟s profits to zero. In the next section we will discuss how a firm should act 
in the case where it believes that it cannot deter entry.  
Accommodated Entry 
Even though an incumbent decides to let another firm enter a given market, it might be in the 
incumbent‟s interest to behave strategically. Compared to the case where the incumbent 
choose a strategy of deterrence, the goal of an accommodation strategy is not to push the 
potential entrant‟s profits to zero, but rather to maximize the incumbent‟s post entry profits.  
We continue by using the investment level K as the incumbent‟s decision variable. 
Differentiating    with respect to K we find how the incumbent‟s investment level affects its 
own profits. 
   
  
 
   
  
 
   
   




   
   




 The first expression is the direct effect. That is, how much an investment will affect 
the incumbent‟s fixed costs.  
 The second part of the expression is the strategic effect. The strategic effect will 
determine if the firm should invest more or less, compared to a situation where 
strategic considerations are absent.  
 Assuming the incumbent will make an optimal production decision, the third 
expression on the right hand side will equal zero. 




   
   




   
   
   
 
   




 The first expression on the right hand side is the effect of the incumbent‟s profit in a 
change in the entrant‟s decision variable.  
 The second part of the right hand side expression is the derivative of the entrants 
reaction function, how the entrant‟s decision variable is affected by a change in the 
incumbent‟s decision variable. 
 The last part of this expression is the effect of the investment on the entrant‟s behavior 
in the second stage of the game. 
Not considering the second part of the right hand side expression, the two parts remaining is 
analogous to the strategic effect in the case of entry deterrence. In the case of entry 
deterrence, the potential entrant is never present in the market, and hence we don‟t have to 
take into account how firms would compete in the case of entry. In the case where entry takes 
place, we have to take into account how competition in the market will take place post entry.  
   
 
   
  is the slope of the reaction curve. It the slope of reaction curves is negative (as in Cournot 
competition), the strategy a firm should employ in the accommodated entry case is the same 
as the strategy it should employ in the case of entry deterrence. In the case of Bertrand 
competition with upward sloping reaction curves, the optimal strategy employed by the 
incumbent is qualitatively different in the case of accommodated entry compared with entry 
deterrence.  
In Bertrand competition decision variables are strategic complements, and reaction curves are 
upward sloping. In Cournot competition they are downward sloping and decision variables 
are strategic substitutes.  
When the market is characterized by Cournot competition, the strategy choice will not depend 
whether or not the incumbent chooses a strategy of entry deterrence or accommodation. In 
Cournot competition, the decision variables (quantities) are strategic substitutes. If the 
incumbent choose to produce a large quantity to deter entry, the entrant should also produce a 
low quantity if the strategy fails.  
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In the case of Bertrand competition, the firm‟s decision variables are strategic complements. 
In this case the incumbent should choose opposite strategies if the firm choose an 
accommodation-strategy compared to a deterrence-strategy. 
Graphically, in Cournot competition, aggressive behavior will shift the incumbent‟s reaction 
curve out while in Bertrand competition, investment will cause the incumbent‟s reaction 
curve to shift inwards. 
 
